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Abstract 
This paper will examine the development of Crime Reduction in British Columbia as a 
new approach to addressing crime. One of the key goals of this paper is to provide support for 
the notion that the type of crime reduction program currently being implemented in British 
Columbia represents a significant change not only for policing, but the broader Criminal Justice 
System (CJS). One of the critical foundational components of this strategy is the recognition that 
substantial progress in the reduction of crime is possible through the better integration of the 
agencies with roles in the prevention and reduction of crime. This shift represents a 
fundamentally different approach in terms of the manner in which the various components of the 
CJS view their own respective roles and, more importantly, how these components work 
cooperatively in an integrated fashion. 
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Introduction 
In Canada, policing is an increasingly expensive enterprise which, in many cases, 
represents the largest part of municipal budgets (Brantingham and Easton, 1998). In 2005, 
expenditures on policing in Canada totaled $9.3 billion; a 4% increase over 2004 after adjusting 
for inflation. In effect, policing costs $288 per Canadian a year (Statistics Canada, 2006). Still, 
by way of comparison, the United Kingdom spends about $400 per person a year (Home Office, 
2006).1 For every dollar spent in all justice sectors in Canada, 62 cents is allocated to policing. In 
fact, 2006 marked the ninth year in a row that constant dollar spending had increased with 
municipal policing accounting for approximately 57% of policing expenditures, provincial 
policing accounting for 23%, and approximately 20% allocated for federal policing (Statistics 
Canada, 2006).  
In addition to the financial costs of policing and the continuing growth of police 
organizations and programs directed at the control of crime, little progress has been made in 
reducing the incidence of crime over the past 30 years (Malm et al., 2005). While there have 
been modest drops in property crimes during the past three years, violent crime has either 
increased slightly or remained stable during that period. However, it may be argued that little 
significance can be drawn from these types of statistics over the short term (Malm et al., 2005). 
Figure 1 below represents the criminal code caseload in British Columbia over the 30 year period 
between 1962 and 2002. There was a decrease between 1997 and 2001, and thereafter, a 
continuing climb. Most notably, the reported incidence of criminal code offences has increased 
by a magnitude of seven over this extended time period (Malm et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
1 Taken from the Home Office website at http://press.homeoffice.gov.United Kingdom/press-
releases/Significant_Boost_To_Police_Serv?version=1.   
 Figure 1:  Growth in Reported Criminal Code Cases in British Columbia 
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The importance of this figure is that it demonstrates the magnitude of the increase of reported 
criminal code cases over the same period of time when several major police programs were 
introduced specifically to reduce crime, such as community policing which was first introduced 
in the early 1970s. Another important issue is that during this same period the clearance rates for 
crimes steadily declined (Malm et al., 2005).  
Although more dollars are being allocated to policing in terms of ‘real dollars’ for 
personnel, equipment, and other resources, police leaders in many jurisdictions struggle with the 
requirement to be more effective with fewer resources. Simply put, British Columbia has 13% of 
Canada’s population, however, it accounts for 20% of all of Canada’s Criminal Code offences 
and receives only 10% of Canada’s spending on policing (Malm et al., 2005). Moreover, 
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Canada’s overall police to population ratio is considerably lower that other developed nations; 
19% lower than Australia’s, 22% lower than in the United States, and 26% lower than in 
England and Wales (Malm et al., 2005). Adding to the challenge, police work has become more 
complex, more time consuming, and more taxing on resources through such factors as disclosure 
rules, case law, and the deployment of technology. These factors, in addition to many other 
issues, have contributed to widening the gap between the incidence of crime and the capacity of 
police to solve crime. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in the capacity of police 
organizations to address crime or to make any meaningful progress in reducing crime (Malm et 
al., 2005).  
In practical terms, police have to make choices about allocating their finite resources. 
This typically results in less attention being paid to less serious crime; the result of which can be 
seen from the significant and continuing drop in clearance rates in B.C.2 The unintended 
consequences of these choices may be more nuisance offences, the development and initiation of 
new criminals, and a potential increase in the number of minor offenders who graduate to more 
serious offending. Exacerbating the problem is the absence of effective integration within the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS). For example, adding police resources without addressing 
capacity downstream from the police, such as prosecution, courts, or corrections, can make the 
situation worse. One potential implication of the lack of justice integration may be that it 
reinforces for offenders the notion that there is little or no risk associated with engaging in 
criminal behaviour or that they are unlikely to be held accountable for their criminal behaviour. 
Based on this cursory overview, it would appear that change is required to improve 
Canada’s criminal justice system to the point where the public has an increased level of 
confidence in the system to both keep it safe from crime and to sufficiently punish and 
rehabilitate those who engage in criminal behaviour. It also appears that there is a growing 
 
2 B.C. Crime Statistics 2005-2006 reported a decrease in the numbers of crimes solved with respect to both violent 
crime and property related crime.  Although the clearance rates for the latter had been falling for several years, more 
recently, between 1999 and 2005, the clearance rates for violent crimes dropped steadily at a rate of 5% per year 
from 75% to 52%. 
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consensus among municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government, law enforcement 
agencies, and the general public that Canadians must consider additional approaches or solutions 
to reducing the incidences of crime and address crime’s underlying causes.  
Recently, British Columbia has adopted the “crime reduction” strategy to achieve these 
broad objectives. The uniqueness of a comprehensive crime reduction strategy is that it is based 
on the integration and the functioning of real partnerships between police, community, and other 
criminal justice system partners, as well as the integration of government agencies to provide a 
vision and leadership for the reduction of crime and strategies to address its underlying causes. In 
both practical and theoretical terms, the crime reduction strategy builds upon community-based 
policing and intelligence-led models of policing. However, its key distinguishing features are its 
focus on developing long-term solutions to crime through more effective integration on a broader 
scale and placing a greater emphasis and focus on the offender, rather than the criminal event. 
In order to provide a detailed accounting of the development of the crime reduction 
strategy in British Columbia, this paper will focus on three specific and key components of the 
crime reduction strategy, namely a prolific and priority offender scheme, the evidence-based 
approach, and integrated justice. In brief, a prolific and priority offender scheme is a multi-
faceted approach involving the three complimentary elements of prevention, enforcement, and 
rehabilitation. The evidence-based approach relates to integration and the use of empirical 
research, information management systems, and strong, appropriate measures to assess and 
evaluate systems and programs. As indicated by its name, integrated justice targets the effective 
integration of all of the players in and associated with the CJS.  
As will be demonstrated throughout this major paper, these three approaches represent 
key departures from the strategies recently employed in the CJS. Moreover, it is through these 
lenses that the effectiveness of the police and other components of the CJS to control and reduce 
crime in Canada will be considered. Specifically, these approaches will be used to provide an 
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argument for the premise that, notwithstanding the challenges currently faced by the CJS, 
meaningful improvements and progress can be achieved through the crime reduction strategy.   
This major paper will be divided into four chapters. Chapter One will examine crime 
reduction in greater detail by taking a critical view of historical and current policing strategies 
and programs, such as community policing, problem-oriented policing, and others. These 
programs have been selected because they are the main approaches introduced in recent years to 
reduce and respond to crime in British Columbia. In this chapter, the need for an evidence-based 
approach to an effective crime reduction strategy (CRS) will also be examined. This chapter will 
also include a discussion on intelligence-led policing and how it relates to the evidence-based 
approach. 
Chapter Two will include a more detailed examination of the crime reduction experience 
in the United Kingdom with a particular emphasis placed on the Prolific and Priority Offender 
Scheme. This Chapter will also examine issues concerning the proper evaluation of programs, 
particularly the evaluation of the crime reduction strategy in the United Kingdom. Chapter Three 
will examine the evolution of the Crime Reduction Program in British Columbia with 
comparisons to the model in the United Kingdom. This chapter will highlight some of the 
important similarities and differences between the models in the United Kingdom and the British 
Columbia and will conclude with a discussion of the significance of integrated justice. The final 
chapter will detail the lessons learned and the remaining challenges for the implementation of the 
crime reduction strategy in British Columbia. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
The crime reduction strategy being implemented in British Columbia is a new model for 
policing in Canada. Over the years, many models for policing, individual programs, and various 
policing strategies have been developed, implemented, and studied in an ongoing effort to 
become more effective in controlling or reducing crime and being more accountable to the 
public. These initiatives ranged from very small and relatively simple strategies to extremely 
complex models. The underlying goal of these efforts was to either prevent, reduce, or eliminate 
specific types of crimes or to achieve a broad-based reduction in the overall level of crime in 
Canada. For example, some programs or strategies sought to remove or reduce the opportunities 
for crimes to occur, while others sought ways to prevent individuals from committing crimes. 
Some were conducted by the police alone, while others were designed to engage the broader 
community in finding solutions to the causes of crime or implementing ways to prevent criminal 
behaviour. The literature review conducted for this major paper is, therefore, broad-based and 
examines the material on Community-Based Policing (CP), Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), 
Reassurance Policing, Broken Windows Theory, and other related material. 
Crime reduction strategies involving robust supporting programs and the horizontal 
integration of services have been implemented primarily in the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand. While there is reference made to crime reduction in the United States and other 
jurisdictions in the research literature, this reference usually refers to a very specific, singular 
initiative directed at specific crime issues and not the system-wide integration characterizing a 
crime reduction strategy. Therefore, in this chapter, some of the programs or initiatives which 
preceded the introduction of a crime reduction strategy will be examined in an effort to 
demonstrate how police in British Columbia are attempting to develop a new model of policing. 
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Community Based Policing 
Community-based policing began in the United States and the United Kingdom during 
the 1980s (Kelling et al., 1974; Loftin and McDowall, 1982; Tien, Simon, & Larson 1978; 
Spelman and Brown, 1981; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Rosenbaum, 1998). Community-based 
policing was both a philosophy and an organizational strategy (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 
1990). Its development was based on the theoretical perspective that police needed to engage the 
community directly and seek its support in order to effectively respond to crime and criminals. 
This strategy was part of a sociological shift that began in the early 1970s as part of the move 
away from the penal-welfare state and towards a more neo-liberal approach to the governance of 
social issues.  
According to Garland (2001), the prevalence of high crime rates and disorder led to the 
recognition that the criminal justice system had a limited ability to control crime and ensure 
public security. This conclusion was accompanied by a change in how society generally viewed 
offenders. In other words, during this time, society had less confidence in models of 
rehabilitation and demanded the imposition of harsher sentences. Rather than blaming criminal 
conduct on what Garland described as “defective or poorly adapted individuals” (2001:148), 
society believed that individuals were responsible for their actions and, therefore, should be held 
accountable. Crime was seen as normal and commonplace in contemporary society and 
committed by “normal” individuals. In response to this evolving environment, agents within the 
criminal justice system developed new strategies that appealed to the political, popular, and 
professional sectors and made members of the public and community organizations increasingly 
more responsible for crime control (Garland, 1996). 
Kelling (1988) suggested that the move to community policing was also due to growing 
citizen disenchantment with police services and an increased frustration with the traditional role 
of the police officer. He claimed that there was widespread disenchantment, especially among 
minorities, with the use of police methods that resulted in police officers becoming increasingly 
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remote and distant from the citizens they served. Research on certain policing strategies, such as 
rapid response, preventive patrols, and investigation, indicated that these approaches had little or 
no effect on reducing crime, reducing citizen levels of fear of victimization, or increasing the 
public’s satisfaction with their police (Edwards, 1999). Given this, it was believed that 
community policing could reduce levels of crime and disorder and improve the quality of life of 
citizens by including them in the policing process. In other words, the model of community 
policing saw the police and the community as partners in fighting crime (Sparrow, 1988). 
Trojanowicz and Carter (1988) defined community policing as a proactive and decentralized 
approach designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime by assigning the same officer in a 
specific geographic area on a long-term basis. In effect, the overarching strategy was that the 
police would know the community and the community would know its police. 
Riechers and Roberg (1990) also described the goals of community policing as fear 
reduction, increased citizen satisfaction with police, and the development of techniques that 
addressed the specific problems or needs of the community. At its core, community policing was 
designed to promote mutual trust and cooperation between the community and the police, and 
challenge people to work together to make their communities safer. However, achieving this goal 
would require a substantial shift in the roles and responsibilities of the police and the community. 
While community police officers would provide the impetus in confronting crime, fear of crime, 
and decay and disorder in neighborhoods, community members would be more active in shaping 
police objectives, providing information to the police, and playing a critical role in the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1992). 
Community policing was, therefore, associated with decentralized, geographically-based 
policing that advocated closer community relationships. Community policing required that the 
police and the community worked together to promote mutual trust and cooperation, and 
empowered neighborhoods to fight crime, drugs, and the public effects of apathy, despair, and 
social unrest (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1992). As implemented in several police 
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departments throughout the United States, community policing was, and continues to be, 
primarily concerned with quality of life issues, such as fear of crime and victimization (Moore 
and Trojanowicz, 1988), and improving citizen perceptions of the police with an emphasis on 
effective working partnerships (Peak, Bradshaw, & Glensor, 1992; Peak and Glensor, 1999).   
With the development of this model of policing, the public learned how to protect 
themselves, how to avoid risky situations, and, in many cases, to lower their expectations of the 
criminal justice system. These were what Garland (2001) described as “responsibilization 
strategies”, or attempts by the state to extend its reach through state agencies to actors in the 
community and private sectors. The goal was to produce “an enhanced network of more or less 
directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls 
of the criminal justice state” (Garland, 2001:124). Although described in various ways, such as 
the emergence of situational crime prevention and reducing opportunities for crime, in effect, the 
onus to prevent and to avoid crime shifted to the victim or potential victim. This shift also 
involved a change from the understanding that crime could be managed and controlled to 
recognition that crime was normative; something to be both aware of and to accept personal 
responsibility for avoiding. 
The importance of the emergence of community-based policing was that it contributed 
philosophically and practically to one of the foundational components of the CRS; namely that 
not only is rehabilitation possible, but that it is the only way that long-term progress to reduce 
crime can be achieved. Moreover, responsibilization strategies recognized that effectively 
dealing with crime was beyond the capacity and capability of the police alone. In other words, 
the general public had to be part of crime reduction solutions. The CRS takes this understanding 
beyond community involvement to the idea of integrated justice in that the solution to many of 
the underlying causes of crime lie beyond the control of police and, in some cases, beyond the 
control of community groups. For example, the provision of effective drug treatment programs 
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requires support from various levels of government due to the fact that program and legislative 
responsibility is shared. 
Still, community policing in the Canadian context has not been able to achieve all of its 
stated objectives. One of the main reasons for this is that it is difficult to determine what is meant 
by community (Griffiths et al., 2001). As a result of communities becoming more diverse with 
community members more mobile and less interested in community affairs, it is difficult to get 
people who live in the same geographic area to agree that they represent or are part of a 
community. Moreover, people are less likely to know their neighbours or to identify themselves 
as part of a “community”, particularly in large urban centers (Griffiths et al., 2001). Skolnick and 
Bayley made similar comments with respect to “community” noting that “sociologically, the 
concept of community implies a group of people with a common history, common beliefs and 
understandings, sense of themselves as ‘us’ and outsiders as ‘them’ and often, but not always, a 
shared territory” (1986:116). In other words, a common geography may have more to do with the 
concept of a neighbourhood than a community. Moreover, “genuine communities are probably 
very rare in modern cities and wherever they do exist, have little interest in cultivating a 
relationship of any kind with police” (1986:136). If so, one’s community may have much more 
to do with the people that an individual feels emotionally, socially, or psychologically connected 
to rather than a shared geographic space. 
Another important issue that comes out of the community-based policing model is that, as 
a general rule, the type of crime which causes the most observable frustration and concern to the 
community is typically what is visible to those living in the community3. This would include 
property crimes, frauds, drug possession offences, drug trafficking offences, and public 
rowdiness; those crimes most commonly experienced by citizens. As crime rates rise, police 
organizations adjust their priorities accordingly (Malm et al., 2005). As a result, more serious 
 
3 According to B.C. Crime Statistics 2005 – 2006, violent crime comprised only 10% of total reported crimes in 
B.C. with property crimes accounting for over 50% of the total figure.  In terms of setting policing priorities, 
however, these type crimes are often considered the least serious. 
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criminality increasingly receives less attention in terms of police response because these kinds of 
offences are not the primary focus of the public. Community policing programs, therefore, often 
deal with relatively less serious crimes, particularly those which directly involve community 
members taking some sort of action.4 As a consequence, community policing may result in 
programs designed to deal with or prevent more serious crimes either being cancelled or 
significantly altered in ways which make them less successful or useful. Based on these 
theoretical and practical issues, an alternative approach which builds on the successes of 
community policing and attempts to alleviate some of its challenges is Problem-Oriented 
Policing. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) 
Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is considered by some as an attempt to re-work the 
standard operating procedures of policing. It is designed to deal with the underlying conditions 
which cause crime and disorder by requiring officers to recognize those factors and respond to 
them. The methodology became known as SARA; scanning, analysis, response, and assessment 
(Goldstein, 1979). This process required the police to analyze their work and identify issues that 
could be successfully addressed by employing problem solving techniques (Goldstein, 1990). 
Removing the opportunity for crime, such as by implementing anti-theft strategies or devices, is 
just one basic example of problem solving techniques. Another strategy is altering personal 
travel patterns to avoid high crime locales in order to reduce the risk of victimization. Moore 
(1992) suggested that thought and analyses were fundamental to problem-oriented policing as 
these elements were necessary to respond effectively to the causes of crime and the ability to 
utilize alternatives other than arrest when crime did occur. Spelman and Eck (1987b) suggested 
that problem-oriented policing converged on three main themes: (1) increased effectiveness; (2) 
 
4 Some of the more common programs associated with Community Policing include Block Watch programs, 
Citizens on Patrol, graffiti reduction, and “lookout” programs targeting, for example, marihuana grow operations or 
clandestine drug production labs. 
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reliance on the expertise and creativity of line officers; and (3) closer involvement with the 
public. For them, these objectives could be realized by attacking the underlying causes of 
behaviours that utilized patrol and investigative time, such as responding to false alarms or to 
complaints where there is little likelihood of finding the subject of the complaint or solving the 
crime. Carrying over from the community policing model, the POP approach encourages officers 
to study problems and develop innovative solutions to ensure that they addressed the needs of the 
community. 
Compared to community-based policing, POP further defined the relationship between 
police and the community by adding a more sophisticated approach to problem solving and 
efforts to address the underlying causes of crime. Comparing the two approaches, problem-
solving and community policing are both strategic concepts that seek to redefine the ends and 
means of policing. However, POP focuses police attention on the problems that contribute to 
criminal incidents, rather than on the incidents exclusively. Conversely, community policing 
more commonly emphasizes the establishment of working partnerships between police and 
communities to reduce crime and enhance security. Still, absent from both approaches are 
effective processes to facilitate integration of services and the critical component of government 
involvement and leadership. The addition of integration represents the step forward achieved by 
the crime reduction strategy. 
For some, the theories grounding community policing and problem-oriented policing 
overlap (Moore, 1992). According to Moore’s assessment, if both strategies occur routinely, 
community policing becomes indistinguishable from problem-oriented policing. For Moore, a 
solid POP philosophy should: (1) allow officers to gather information about all the circumstances 
contributing to problems so that their underlying causes may be better understood; (2) the design 
of police operations should be oriented to deal with these identified problems; (3) evaluation 
measures should be developed to determine whether the design of the police operation has been 
successful; and (4) police must recognize the important role of the community in selecting the 
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problems to be addressed by the police and in designing and implementing solutions. While all 
of these elements are seen as critical, it is the fourth element that is considered paramount. For 
Moore, the goals of crime fighting are best achieved by establishing trusting relations with the 
community. There is also a need to recognize that police have broader opportunities to prevent 
and control crime. However, the current model of policing in Canada is not exclusively 
influenced by community policing models or POP. Rather, policing has been influenced by a 
number of other approaches. 
Table 1 presented below attempts to capture the key components of the three major 
approaches to policing strategies employed over the past 30 years; beginning with Community 
Based Policing, progressing through Problem Oriented Policing, and ending with the Crime 
Reduction Strategy.   
Table 1: Overview of Policing Strategies  
Community Policing Problem Oriented 
Policing 
Crime Reduction 
• Reduce fear 
• Promote trust 
• Decentralize police 
• Empower neighborhoods 
• Rehabilitate offenders 
• Engage community 
 
• Problem analysis 
• Problem solving 
• Increased effectiveness 
• Focus on causes of 
crime 
• Better design of police 
structures 
• Closer involvement with 
community 
 
• Evidence-based 
approach 
• Broad-based and 
effective partnerships 
• Shared vision and 
shared crime reduction 
targets 
• Strong accountability 
structures 
• Rigorous evaluation of 
programs 
• Recognition that 
solutions to crime go 
well beyond policing 
• Integrated justice 
structures across 
community and 
government 
• Integration of 
community concerns 
and their direct 
involvement in solutions 
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There is a gradual progression throughout these strategies to develop stronger partnerships and 
increasingly more sophisticated problem solving techniques. It is the extent of this progression, 
together with the fundamental changes which result from a truly integrated justice system, which 
distinguishes crime reduction from the previous two strategies.  
 
Other Approaches to Policing 
Models of policing or policing strategies have also been affected over the years by 
criminological or sociological theories. One such theory is broken windows theory. This theory 
holds that “crime was encouraged by allowing activities that created the impression in particular 
places that standards of civility were such that no one cared, that anything goes. The primary 
indicators of such ‘free-fire’ places were signs of physical deterioration (broken windows) and 
disorderly behavior (panhandling)” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 136). Broken windows theory 
posited that certain neighbourhood characteristics, such as litter on the street or open drug 
trafficking, send signals about the health of the community in terms of crime, and that visible 
evidence of decay, such as broken windows or the visible deterioration of buildings, encouraged 
crime and caused residents to feel vulnerable, unsafe, and less willing to intervene to maintain 
public order. This theory suggested that paying attention to these issues, for example by repairing 
broken windows or keeping the neighbourhood clean, could help prevent and reduce 
neighbourhood levels of crime. In effect, the main contention raised by this theoretical approach 
was that neighbourhoods that did not tolerate minor forms of delinquency, deviancy, or 
criminality or signs of social disorder prevented the establishment of more major forms of 
disorder. Evidence in support of this theory is somewhat difficult to find, to the extent that it can 
actually achieve a significant reduction in a broad range of crimes. While there is some evidence 
to support the notion that vandalism and littering may be reduced, there is little empirical evident 
to support the claim that the reduction of petty crime or anti-social behavior necessarily leads to 
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the prevention of major crimes (Lott, 2000). Moreover, any relationship between disorder and 
serious crime was found to be modest at best (Thacher, 2004). Critics pointed to the fact that 
during the 1990’s, major crimes dropped significantly in many large cities in the U.S., including 
those that had not adopted broken windows strategies. Others noted that alternative explanations 
needed to be considered, including changing demographics and even the legalization of abortion 
in the late 1980s (Levitt and Dubner, 2005) as having a more direct role in the reduction of 
crime. 
Within a relatively short period of time, “reassurance policing” (Fielding and Innes, 
2006; Herrington and Millie, 2006) developed in the United Kingdom as a variation of “broken 
windows”. The Home Office, the Department of Communities, and local governments rolled this 
strategy out under the livability agenda with a major focus of swiftly responding to graffiti and 
vandalism. The Government claimed to be committed to the principle of community engagement 
in policing and to delivering 'neighborhood policing' stating that the interface between these two 
concepts was crucial. In the United Kingdom, 'citizen focus' was the broad philosophy for 
policing whereas neighborhood policing was focused specifically on crime, disorder, feelings of 
safety, and service delivery in local areas.5 Accountability of police services to their 
communities was one of the main objectives of the initiative. In this way, citizen-focused 
policing and neighbourhood policing are comparable and similar to community policing in the 
United States.  
Neighbourhood policing holds that community engagement must ensure community 
participation at all levels of policing. However, it also recognized that a program of 
neighbourhood policing will not automatically deliver community engagement (Herrington and 
Millie, 2006). Reassurance policing was included as part of the 2002 Police Reform Act, 
successive National Policing Plans, and the 2004 Police Reform White Paper. This strategy 
 
5 http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/reform-programme/citizen-focus/neighbourhood-policing 
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evolved from concern that, while the crime rate was falling, there was a public perception that it 
had continued to rise. This disparity was called the “reassurance gap” with reassurance policing 
seen as a way of closing the gap by providing better information to the public. 
The importance of examining these other programs is to understand what has worked 
historically in local and national efforts to control or reduce crime, and how successful 
innovations might be adapted to the Canadian context. This is necessary because, 
notwithstanding the goals of community policing, problem-oriented policing, and other 
programs, initiatives, and theories, crime in Canada has generally increased over the years with a 
corresponding drop in the level of efficiency of various components of the CJS, including the 
police. It can be argued, therefore, that there is room for significant improvement across the 
entire CJS, particularly in British Columbia because one of the reasons for the increase in crime 
may be the lack of effective integration between agencies and the absence of a focused approach 
to seeking solutions to crime related issues. 
Rather than a complete rejection of previous policing models, the current RCMP decision 
to adopt crime reduction strategies in British Columbia should be seen as the next step in the 
process of evolving police work from the community policing model. The link between the two 
approaches is the demand by the public to have greater involvement and say in matters which 
affect them, such as policing. A key distinction, however, lies in the fact that, whereas 
community policing was primarily police driven, the CRS is a much more complex process 
involving a significant number of partner agencies in a structured fashion. Ideally, this strategy 
should be a government-led process which would set the vision for the strategy and provide 
leadership to facilitate strong integration across government agencies.   
Given the realities of crime and criminals in the contemporary period, police 
organizations need to create at least two distinct pathways for dealing with the broad range of 
criminality today; one to respond to the type of criminality that community involvement can 
contribute to reducing and another which seeks to address more sophisticated crime and 
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criminals. Community policing models are too simplistic to address crime issues in the 21st 
century due to the increasing complexity of the issues underlying crime, as well as the need for 
more effective horizontal and vertical integration of the criminal justice system, other agencies 
responsible for social order, and the public. 
 
An Evidence-Based Approach to Crime Reduction 
One of the key considerations for the implementation of the CRS was to develop a 
partnership between the RCMP and academia. The topic of academic and police partnerships has 
been the subject of discussion at various levels in recent years (Laycock, 2001). However, it was 
not until recently that meaningful progress has been made on the issue in Canada. Although it is 
possible to point to a number of short-term initiatives that have examined a specific crime-related 
issue, there are no examples of formal, long-term relationships between the police and academia 
directed at the broad issue of significantly reducing crime in society and finding ways to make 
these reductions sustainable.6 
This type of partnership has substantial benefits for both parties. For academia, a key 
benefit of this developing partnership is the ability to gain access to police data, rather than 
publicly available data. For police, it means access to evidence-based research with which to 
develop programs, as well as the ability to conduct effective, detailed, and timely crime analysis. 
In a 2001 paper, Research for Police: Who Needs It?, written for the Australian Institute 
of Criminology, Gloria Laycock argued that the time was right for a ‘more intimate’ relationship 
between researchers and practitioners given the growing emphasis on crime reduction and the 
new focus on outcomes. She argued that this new imperative highlighted the need for an 
evidence-based approach to crime reduction practices. The traditional relationship between 
academia and policing was described this way: 
 
6 The Memorandum of Understanding between Simon Fraser University, the University College of the Fraser 
Valley, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Province of British Columbia, which assigned three University 
research Chairs to the RCMP for a period of five years, is the first partnership of its kind in Canada.  
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Practitioners and researchers have operated in different universes for a long time. 
Researchers study police practices and criticize what they find, because that is what 
researchers are trained to do.  They publish their work in journals and worry about 
tenure, their next grant, the number of citations they have amassed and the purity of 
their methodology. Contributing to the development of policing is not always top of 
the list. The police complain and ignore the research: their perspective is that they do 
not need the hassle it causes and they can carry out the tasks required of them 
without any help from researchers (Laycock, 2001:1). 
According to Laycock, fundamental changes to the “deep structure” of both the research 
community and to policing are underway based on the increased demands for “outcomes” to 
keep crime levels down. Furthermore, in those cases where crime has been reduced, there was 
little research to explain why that happened. As important as it is to actually make progress in the 
reduction of crime, it is perhaps equally important to understand why that progress had occurred 
so that successful efforts can be replicated, where appropriate, in other jurisdictions. As stated by 
Laycock, “while there are lots of books published each year on policing, there is no published 
knowledge base on what works and what does not work in the profession. The only way to 
establish a real body of knowledge is through systematic and prolonged investment in research” 
(2001:2). 
Laycock’s position was that increasing citizen involvement in policing, with strengthened 
accountability structures, were important strategies for building trust and confidence in policing. 
Communication was seen as a key component in this process and she suggested that poor 
communication contributed to the community feeling unsafe which subsequently undermined the 
effectiveness of policing strategies (Laycock, 2001). It was these same issues which led to the 
introduction of neighbourhood policing in the United Kingdom. 
Esserman and Pesare (2004) described the collaborative relationship between police in 
Providence, Rhode Island and the School of Justice Studies at Roger Williams University as 
recognizing the utility of having resources from outside the police department help extend 
severely strained police resources. As part of that specific partnership, the police department 
shared police data with the university in hopes that the data would be studied from an academic 
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perspective. Esserman and Pesare noted that the most immediate benefit to their collaboration 
was the practical application of research on police strategies. 
Cosner and Loftus (2005) focused on the general attitude of the law enforcement culture 
towards research and noted that police, generally speaking, were practical and wanted concepts 
they could put to work immediately as opposed to theories which tended to broadly explain 
events. They concluded that action research was the best model for a police-researcher alliance 
because the participatory nature of the model produced better results for the police. 7 According 
to Cosner and Loftus (2005), better results were defined by the police as evidence-based 
recommendations arising from research findings.  
In summing up the need for partnering in research, Cosner and Loftus argued that: 
 
Effective partnerships between leaders and academic researchers are critical to 
discovering and implementing best policing practices. Robust research projects 
performed within law enforcement agencies with the direct involvement of law 
enforcement leaders lead to sound and substantive policy. These partnerships are 
mutually satisfactory: researchers are intensely interested in pursuing such projects, 
while law enforcement leaders are just as interested in turning the results into 
enhanced policing practices (2005:3). 
Developing this partnership, however, required a level of trust. Where undertaken, these 
experiments have demonstrated to the police that their involvement in research partnerships 
provided them with a critical role in defining issues of interest to them for research. The 
traditional obstacle to achieving this goal was the academic emphasis on publications in the 
absence of practical accountability. The solution was the development of a research model that 
included the needs of the police.  
Jensen (2006) noted that evidence-based policing is a policing philosophy that applied 
equally to every aspect of policing. In other words, it is about having a sound basis for the 
techniques employed and the decisions made, all informed by reliable and relevant research.   
 
Evidence-based policing is the use of the best available research on the outcomes of 
police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and officers. Put 
 
7 Fraenkel and Wallen (1999) defined action research as research conducted by one or more individuals or groups 
for the purposes of solving a problem or obtaining information in order to inform local practice. 
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more simply, evidence-based policing uses research to guide practice and evaluate 
practitioners. It uses the best evidence to shape the best practice. It is a systematic 
effort to parse out and codify unsystematic “experience” as the basis for police 
work, refining it by ongoing systematic testing of hypotheses (Sherman 1998:8). 
Sherman suggested that evidence-based policing “contains the principles of its own 
implementation” (1998: 10), in that the positive results will promote further implementation.   
 
No institution is likely to increase voluntarily its accountability except under strong 
external pressure. It is unlikely that evidence-based policing could be adopted by a 
police executive simply because it appears to be a good idea. The history of 
evidence-based medicine and education strongly suggests that professionals will 
only make such changes under external coercion (Sherman, 1998:10). 
Sherman contended that performance measures would force cooperation. While this may be true 
in other jurisdictions, the evidence-based approach in British Columbia was initiated by the 
police and without external pressure. The importance of this is that the RCMP may, therefore, be 
more ‘open’ to evidence-based research findings and more willing to partner with academics. 
The role of evidence-based policing continues to gain prominence among the RCMP in 
British Columbia because most police organizations, in an effort to meet and address the 
complexities of policing, continually implement a wide range of programs and initiatives as they 
seek out new ways to be more effective and accountable. Most police organizations, however, 
are not particularly adept at doing the research required to develop and validate these initiatives.8 
The proliferation of community policing initiatives over the past 30 years, in many respects, 
suffered from this lack of research. These efforts are another example of very popular and 
widespread programs which have had little peer-reviewed, empirically-based evaluations over 
the years. In fact, the same can be said of most programs in policing.9 
Tilley and Laycock (2002) focused on several key components required in the evidence-
based approach with respect to the need for a strong strategic planning capacity.  
 
 
8 The D.A.R.E. program (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) is a good example of the extent to which some 
programs have been implemented and embraced by police organizations without the benefit of sound research. 
9 As a senior manager within the RCMP, a member of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, and the 
Canadian Chiefs of Police, the author has direct knowledge of the fact that there is little substantive research done 
within policing either before or after a program has been implemented.   
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If police and partnerships are to adopt this approach as a matter of routine, there 
needs to be capacity for strategic thinking at the appropriate level. In the United 
Kingdom, the currently most relevant policing level would be the basic command 
unit, to which, in many forces, resources are now delegated. For partnerships it is the 
district level local authority area at which statutory responsibility is pitched. In a 
small US police agency it might be at Chief Officer level whilst in the larger 
agencies it might be at precinct or district level (Tilley and Laycock, 2002:46). 
In discussing the type of leaders needed, Tilley and Laycock stated: 
 
The individual or group carrying out this function needs to be ‘research-literate’ – 
they need to know what the research literature has to say about problem 
specification and tactics, mechanisms and contexts. They also need to be sufficiently 
senior - carry enough clout - to be able to direct the use of police and other resources 
and, when relevant, to relate to other potential contributors to any strategic plan 
(2002:46). 
The key points with respect to both of these comments are that careful consideration must be 
given to the distribution of resources which support and facilitate strategic thinking and 
evidence-based processes within an organization, and that those responsible for implementation 
and oversight need to be at a very senior level in the organization. The authors also commented 
on the requirement for good data about crime and criminals and stressed the importance of 
properly trained crime analysts. Finally, they stressed the importance of leverage in terms of 
partnerships.  
 
It is now generally acknowledged that the police alone can have only a very partial 
effect on crime levels. They have limited detection and arrest capabilities. Moreover, 
enforcement is a relatively inefficient means of crime prevention. Pre-emptive 
tactics against crime generally call for actions beyond the direct control of the 
police. For this reason, partnership has been emphasized increasingly over the past 
two decades, and has become ubiquitous in Britain where it has been put on a 
statutory footing. This growth in partnership working should increase the likelihood 
that others will accept their crime reduction responsibilities. However, not all of 
those who can act belong to partnerships and of those who do belong; some may still 
be reluctant to incur the costs of prevention. Under these circumstances leverage 
may be necessary. As with prevention itself, the police may sometimes provide 
leverage directly on their own, and they may sometimes apply it with the help of 
collaborating partners. Police and partnerships need to get better at exercising their 
considerable leverage to persuade hesitant agencies, institutions and individuals to 
play their part (Laycock, 1996). There are several well-documented examples (see, 
for example, Laycock and Tilley, 1995) where leverage has led ‘reluctant’ partners 
to take action, when they may not have been keen to do so for financial or other 
reasons.  Successful problem-solving requires familiarity with and skills in leverage. 
It is not enough to explain failure by referring to others’ failures to act. Effective 
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problem-solving includes finding ways to persuade them to do so (Emphasis added) 
(Tilley and Laycock, 2002:47). 
 
The notion of leverage is important in the current context of British Columbia given that 
program implementation, at least to this point, has not resulted in the imposition of legislative 
requirements on agencies, nor have there been financial incentives for agencies to become 
involved in crime reduction strategies. 
 
Intelligence-led Policing 
The evidence-based approach has been closely linked to “intelligence-led” policing. 
However, according to Ratcliffe (2003), there is a degree of confusion in the literature over the 
meaning of intelligence-led policing. The term first came into use in the early 1990s, however, 
there remains no commonly accepted definition. The Criminal Intelligence Directorate of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) used the following definition:  
 
Intelligence-led policing is a term that has only begun to gain currency in the last 
few years. For this reason, it lacks a single, overarching definition. Most would 
agree, however, that at its most fundamental definition, intelligence-led policing 
involves the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end 
product designed to inform police decision-making at both the tactical and strategic 
levels. It is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, 
rather than the reverse. It is innovative and, by some standards, even radical, but it is 
predicated on the notion that a principal task of the police is to prevent and detect 
crime rather than simply to react to it (Smith, 1998). 
 It should be noted that this description pre-dates the introduction of the CRS in British Columbia 
and, therefore, should be expanded to recognize the contribution of an evidence-based approach 
through partnerships with academia. 
Beginning in 1993, several reports and papers in the United Kingdom and Australia 
examined the concepts that would eventually be recognized as intelligence-led policing. The 
Audit Commission Report into police effectiveness was one of the first to examine the 
relationship between economic accountability and effective policing (Audit Commission, 1993). 
This report identified three specific areas of focus with respect to becoming more effective at 
reducing and preventing crime: (1) the existing roles and the level of accountability lacked 
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integration and efficiency; (2) police were failing to make the best use of resources; and (3) a 
greater emphasis on criminals would be more effective than focusing on crimes. 
In 1997, a publication by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), Policing 
With Intelligence, provided a clear vision for intelligence-led policing. The general theme was 
the recognition of the strong link between the concept of intelligence-led policing and the 
implementation of crime reduction strategies. The aim of the process, according to Ratcliffe 
(2003), could be interpreted from the tactical tasking priorities of the United Kingdom’s National 
Intelligence Model (NIM) which concentrated on four key elements: (1) targeting offenders 
(especially the targeting of active criminals through overt and covert means); (2) the 
management of crime and disorder hotspots; (3) the investigation of linked series of crimes and 
incidents; and (4) the application of preventative measures, including working with local 
partnerships to reduce crime and disorder (NCIS 2000). 
One of the key principles identified through the development of NIM were theories about 
prolific offenders and the recognition that a relatively small percentage of criminal offenders 
were responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. More important was the decision to 
concentrate on offenders as opposed to crime.10 The research also informed a number of policy 
issues, such as the Drug Intervention Program and issues around offender management. One of 
the key reasons for the implementation of NIM was the need for a more systematic use of 
intelligence across operational units and the use of research to better inform the hierarchy of 
strategic priorities. Based on these developments, Ratcliffe defined intelligence-led policing as 
 
10 This represents an interesting parallel to the approach taken by the RCMP in the late-1990s to shift from 
“commodity-based enforcement” to targeting offenders or offending organizations. The essence of this approach 
was captured in the RCMP Operations Model in place since 1998 and can be described as an offender-based model 
designed to target the most significant criminals in a given jurisdiction. 
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“the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to 
facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external 
partnership projects drawn from an evidential base” (Ratcliff 2003:3). Given that there was a 
limited ability for the police to significantly affect the level of crime in society, Ratcliffe 
acknowledged the power of effective partnerships in addressing the causal factors underlying 
crime and the ability to reduce crime. Indeed, it could be said that partnerships, such as those 
developed under the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) agreements in use in the 
United Kingdom, are the cornerstone of effective crime reduction strategies and the key 
component in an intelligence-led strategy.  
In addressing another key element of intelligence-led policing, Cope (2004) argued that 
there was an inadequate understanding amongst police officers of the value of crime analysis. 
This lack of awareness resulted in an ineffective use of crime-analyst products and skills. Cope 
suggested that a “clash of cultures” was one of the principle barriers to the integration of analysis 
into policing. This clash was primarily a result of a police culture that did not accept the 
“civilian” view of how certain investigative work should be undertaken. However, this is one of 
the key barriers to overcome if an agency is to achieve true intelligence-led status.11 The 
importance of police organizations addressing this problem cannot be overstated as an analytical 
capacity and capability is a key foundational piece of establishing effective intelligence-led 
practices and strategies. It is for these reasons that crime analysis received significant attention in 
the crime reduction strategy implementation process in British Columbia.  
It may be that the gap between evidence-based policing and intelligence-led policing has 
narrowed to a point where they have become indistinguishable. At its inception, intelligence-led 
policing seemed to have a strong operational focus on the effective targeting of criminals and 
 
11 It is worthy of note that the Criminal Intelligence Program within the Royal Canadian Police in British Columbia , 
since 2001, has been headed by a civilian member of the Force.   
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criminal organizations, as opposed to a more broad, policy-based approach to examining both 
operational and administrative issues in policing. 
In sum, several key concepts arise from an analysis of community-based policing, 
evidence-based approaches, and intelligence-led policing. All three models support the rationale 
for change on the basis that the capacity for police to respond to crime has been greatly 
diminished and that it is imperative to become more effective with available resources. Another 
key issue is that the complexity of policing and the nature of crime have forced police to 
reconsider and to reevaluate basic assumptions about what current policing strategies can 
achieve. For example, at the local level in British Columbia, despite efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of the CJS, a number of complexities, such as judicial disclosure and new and 
evolving criminal case law, continue to contribute to an ever-expanding capacity gap in the CJS. 
Beyond a lack of effectiveness in reducing crime, the increasing costs associated with 
policing, and other pressures on policing, there are other good reasons for changing the current 
approach to policing and to examine and evaluate how policing interrelates with other parts of 
the CJS and the Canadian public. It is time to move on from the community policing model to a 
model which brings greater inclusion and integration of all of the parties with a stake in crime 
issues. However, this does not mean that there is a need to discard programs like community 
policing or problem-oriented policing. Perhaps too much is expected of programs that have not 
been adequately adjusted over the past three decades to respond to the changes in both the 
policing environment and in society.12  
Community policing was a necessary step in the evolution of policing; a key step in 
building community involvement and community awareness about the complexities of policing. 
Properly adapting the next phase of community policing will be an important element in 
educating and building consensus at the community level on the next step in the evolution of 
 
12 The increases in the reporting of criminal code cases with the corresponding decline of police clearances rates 
mentioned earlier support the contention that these programs have not met their goals with respect to the reduction 
of crime. 
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policing strategies. It is useful to note that many of the problems identified in this chapter have 
been addressed in the CRS implemented in the United Kingdom. The next chapter, therefore, 
will explore the United Kingdom’s crime reduction strategy experience in greater detail with an 
emphasis on the evaluation of this approach. 
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Chapter Two: The Crime Reduction Experience in the United 
Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the implementation of the Crime Reduction Program (CRP) was 
driven from the top down in a government-led process involving significant funding, new 
legislation, and a broad infrastructure to facilitate implementation (Home Office, 2006).13 The 
Home Office is responsible for public safety and security in England and Wales, including 
policing, corrections, and criminological research. The Home Office is the lead department for 
the government-wide policy commitment to reducing the volume of crime. This policy mandate 
was supported by the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) which required active participation in 
crime reduction programs by all local governments and agencies and by all departments and 
agencies of the central government. At the local level, crime reduction is pursued through Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships or legislatively mandated multi-agency entities with 
specific crime reduction responsibilities. The Crime Reduction Program enjoyed a high degree of 
political support from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet (Homel et al, 2004). 
The overarching goals for the approach were set out in the National Community Safety 
Plan 2006-2009. The plan was best described by the following three statements from Hazel 
Blears:14  
 
If we are to make our communities still safer, everyone, from the heart of national 
government, through regional and local partners, right through to neighborhoods and 
the people who live in them must play their part. We need to create a new 
relationship between public services and the communities they serve which will 
encourage accountability, trust, and cooperation a mutual respect. And we need to 
                                                 
13 During the course of this research, Crime Reduction Programs and initiatives in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand were reviewed. In April, 2006, a delegation from Canada comprised of Dr. Paul Brantingham, Dr. 
Patricia Brantingham, Dr. Darryl Plecas, Dr. Allan Castle, Assistant Commissioner Al Macintyre, Chief Supt. Fraser 
MacAuley, and Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass, led by Fiona Young of the United Kingdom, traveled to the 
United Kingdom and held extensive meetings with Government, police, and other officials. There was little 
evidence of similar programs in existence elsewhere in the world. Although there are programs identified as “crime 
reduction” in the United States, for the most part, they are targeted initiatives directed at a specific crime type and do 
not involve a comprehensive set of initiatives such as those set out in the United Kingdom.   
14 Minister of State for the Home Office. 
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work together to tackle extremism and racism in all its forms.” (Emphasis added) 
(National Community Safety Plan, p. 2).   
 
The reference to a “new” relationship between public services and communities is a key aspect 
of a strategic change mentioned above. This new relationship points to the need to move beyond 
a general relationship between the police and communities to one which includes government in 
the description of public services. This point is emphasized further as: 
 
The National Community Safety Plan is not limited to the work of the police.  
Crucial as their role is, they alone cannot provide for all our safety and security.  
That is why, shortly after taking office, we legislated to introduce Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships across England and Wales. We brought together for 
the first time ever, all the chief players at the local level the police, police 
authorities, local government, primary care trusts, children’s trusts, fire services and 
other public sector bodies to prevent and reduce crime and anti-social behavior…. 
But, it is communities themselves which lie at the heart of the plan. We need them to 
identify the community safety priorities for their neighbourhoods, work with the key 
agencies at the local level to make sure they are tackled responsibly and effectively 
and then hold them to account for what they have promised to do. We must 
remember that the public will only feel safe if they have confidence that the agencies 
on whom they rely are responsive to their concerns and are providing high quality 
services to them (National Community Safety Plan 2006-2009:3). 
In short, the national government in the United Kingdom has taken a very pro-active and serious 
role in ensuring that crime reduction strategies in England and Wales are a reality. The plan 
ensures that everyone understands their roles in community safety. Legislation and performance 
agreements for all partner agencies brought local governments and other social agencies into 
active participation in the program. 
The current National Community Safety Plan began with a list of crime reduction 
accomplishments resulting from government initiatives.15 It then set out the national 
government’s key community safety priorities for the next three years. It also set out its 
expectations for key public partners in improving community safety. As the plan contained the 
Home Secretary’s priorities for the police, it also served as the National Policing Plan. The five 
community safety themes of the government, as set out in the plan, were: (1) making 
 
15 Briefing by Steve Trimmins of the Home Office. 
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communities stronger and more effective; (2) further reducing crime and anti-social behavior; (3) 
creating safer environments; (4) protecting the public and building confidence; and (5) 
improving people’s lives so they are less likely to commit offences or re-offend (Home Office 
2005). Each of these themes was broken down into key strategic deliverables or goals to be 
accomplished by 2008. 
The Home Office took the lead in building a safe, just, and tolerant society in England 
and Wales.16 To do so, it set a number of key goals which included reducing the fear of crime, 
focusing on prolific offenders, and ensuring that citizens, communities, and the private sector 
became more engaged in seeking solutions to crime problems. The Home Office clearly 
understood that community safety was the product of partnership and that the police were only 
one of many partners in this endeavor. 
Recognizing that informal arrangements prior to 1998 had not worked in a wholly 
satisfactory way, as they had no consistent mandate and evaluation, legislation was enacted to 
formalize crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom. The Crime and Disorder Act 
(CDA) mandated the creation of new community partnerships with statutory responsibilities. In 
essence, the CDA was an enabler, a catalyst for action that drew attention to five key areas in 
reducing crime and promoting communities: (1) targeting prolific offenders; (2) developing 
effective drug intervention programs; (3) developing a comprehensive drug strategy; (4) 
reducing re-offending; and (5) engaging communities. The first two involved the implementation 
of specific programs, while the others were more broadly based policies. The CDA imposed on 
local communities, and on the various public agencies that contributed to the safety and 
healthiness of the community, a statutory requirement to take action to reduce crime and disorder 
 
16 Briefing by David Truscott, United Kingdom Home Office, April 18th., 2006. 
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(Home Office, 2006). In other words, improving community well-being was the central aim of 
the legislation. 
The CDA also called for performance management and effectiveness evaluation. In 
pursuit of these objectives, public funds were being expended and the Home Office and the 
government wanted to know that these funds were being used in an appropriate and value-added 
fashion. To achieve these objectives, the inclusion and definitions of performance management 
measurement occurred through a series of agreements and frameworks which included: (1) local 
area agreements with local strategic partnerships; (2) performance agreements with Drug Action 
Teams and CDRPs; (3) local Criminal Justice Board performance frameworks; (4) best value 
performance indicators regime (applied to police, local authorities, and CDRPs); and (5) a police 
performance assessment framework (Home Office 2001). Taken together, these elements provide 
a strong framework for effective partnerships with mechanisms to ensure that it is possible to 
have all of the partners helping each other achieve their goals. At the local level, there were 
generally five agencies which formed the core of the scheme: (1) the police; (2) the fire 
department; (3) health; (4) education; (5) and, where applicable, the police board which was 
identified as a responsible body under the Act.  
Preliminary results indicated that success was contingent on the participation by the top 
management level in every respective agency.17 Moreover, effective performance required 
collaborative work by decision-makers. In other words, effective participation could not be 
delegated down. In fact, participants were pushed for solutions.18 Timely data and information 
sharing between participating agencies were critical for successful crime reduction programs.  
The integration and coordination of criminal justice system activities that often operated 
independently and sometimes operated in an adversarial nature formed an important part of the 
overall crime reduction initiative. This conclusion was based on the belief that it made little 
 
17 Briefing By David Truscott, Home Office, April 18th, 2006. 
18 Briefing by Chief Constable, Northumbria Police, April 21st, 2006. 
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sense to improve the effectiveness of one part of the criminal justice system if other parts of the 
system lacked the capacity to handle changed case volumes or could not themselves increase 
their operating effectiveness.  
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal trial process through the better 
trials unit, for example, was a major justice reform initiative within the overall crime reduction 
programme. The Better Trials Unit is responsible for policy on the laws governing procedures in 
the magistrates' courts, the Crown Court, and the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), including 
policy on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, the admissibility of evidence in criminal 
proceedings, and implementing the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This provides a good example of 
how achieving efficiencies in one part of the CJS can have a positive impact on other parts of the 
CJS. Reducing the number of court appearances an accused makes prior to trial and shortening 
the length of criminal trials not only saves time, money, and resources in the court system, but 
also reduces policing costs, costs to the accused and his family, as well as saving costs to 
victims. 
National coordination and leadership provided under the National Community Safety 
Plan was quite remarkable and was probably one of the key elements to the strategy’s overall 
success (National Community Safety Plan, 2006 - 2009). The government took a pro-active and 
focused role in ensuring the crime reduction strategy in the U.K. was not just a strategy, but a 
reality. Through this plan, the government ensured that everyone understood that they had a role 
to play in community safety and that they needed to work together in order to achieve success. 
The clear vision of the government was well articulated and was supported by excellent 
communication tools on the web and in print. This carried through to the local offices around the 
country. 
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The high degree of integration and the strength of partnerships were impressive. 
Regardless of government will, money, resources, or any other factor, a program of this nature 
could not work without strong and trusting partnerships. The tools of the trade, with respect to 
this ambitious program, were the Prolific and Priority Offender Program19, the targeting of crime 
hot spots, the targeting of the most victimized, and a strong drug intervention program supported 
by wrap-around services and solid oversight from the courts. The CDA also introduced a range 
of youth justice provisions which led to the establishment of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs).  
The mandate of the YOTs was framed in Section 38 of the 1998 CDA. The goals of this program 
included preventing young people from offending in the first instance, carrying out standardized 
assessments of young people entering the CJS, and delivering intervention programs for young 
people. There was also a Street Crime initiative20 and the Liveability and Respect Agenda21. 
Finally, it should be noted that ongoing program evaluation was considered important and was 
carried out with considerable rigor in efforts to follow an evidence-based approach to initiatives. 
  
The Prolific and Priority Offender Strategy 
The crime reduction approach in the United Kingdom is both simple and complex. At its 
heart is a focused approach on a relatively small proportion of the offender population, the 
prolific and priority offenders (PPO), who are responsible for a disproportional amount of crime. 
The theory underlying this approach is that by dealing effectively with this group of offenders, a 
substantial reduction in raw numbers of criminal offences will occur over time (Home Office, 
 
19 The Newcastle PPO field observation was hosted by Detective Constable John Snowdon and Probation Officer Laura 
Seebohm. 
20 The Street Crime Initiative began in March 2002 with the aim of reducing street crime (robbery and snatch theft) in the 10 
worst affected areas in England. These 10 areas accounted for over 80% of all robberies in England ans Wales. A joint inspection 
of the agencies involved in the initiative found many examples of good practice and found it to be effective in reducing street 
crime. However, the inspection found room for improvement, particularly in the rehabilitation of offenders. 
21 Described by the Home Office as a coherent policy package delivered through governance changes and service improvement to 
empower people so that they can shape the public services they use and influence decisions about the things that matter to them.  
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2001). The goal of the PPO strategy was to reduce the number of overall crimes through the 
selective targeting of a relatively small percentage of criminals. The target population of 
persistent offenders was identified from the volume and nature of the crimes they committed and 
the damage they inflicted on local communities. The strategy was, however, more complex than 
simply police targeting of offenders. The PPO strategy was designed to deal with both prolific 
offending and its root causes by: (1) preventing and deterring potentially prolific offenders; (2) 
catching and convicting those who were already prolific offenders; and (3) rehabilitating and 
resettling offenders back into the community (Home Office, 2001). These components were 
referred to as the three strands of the strategy in the United Kingdom’s model.  
The “Prevent and Deter” part of the strategy aimed to stop people, overwhelmingly 
young people, from entering the prolific offender group (Home Office, 2001). Essentially, it 
involved targeting youth at risk of becoming prolific offenders, seeking to address issues leading 
to criminality, and preventing any further involvement in crime. The second component of the 
strategy, “Catch and Convict”, aimed to arrest and prosecute those who were already prolific 
offenders (Home Office, 2001). It was this part of the strategy that the police had the most 
influence over and was, therefore, the logical starting point of a CRS. The third component, 
“Rehabilitate and Resettle”, worked to enable the identified PPO group to stop offending by 
offering offenders a range of supportive interventions. This aspect proved to be the most critical 
in terms of reducing recidivism and crime because without dealing with the underlying causes of 
a criminal’s lifestyle, such as drug dependence which leads to acquisitive crimes, the offender 
was more likely to continue with their offending. Any benefit gained as a result of temporarily 
intervening in their ability to commit crimes, for example through incarceration, was typically 
lost upon their release back into society without community supports and services. Nowhere in 
the strategy was the power of effective partnerships more important because it required the 
coordinated application of resources from many agencies to effectively deal with all of the issues 
which contribute to offending.  
34 
 
                                                
The United Kingdom determined that it was not wise to impose a single definition for a 
PPO across the country, but rather to set general guidelines and allow local authorities to define a 
prolific offender within the context of their own jurisdiction (Home Office 2001). This was due 
to the different range of subjective values that various cities and communities placed on the 
various types of criminal behavior. For example, a certain crime considered serious in a small 
community may not pose much concern in a larger city. It was decided, therefore, that 
communities should be left some discretion in deciding their key priorities. Nonetheless, there 
were guidelines established to assist in the selection of PPOs outlined in the National Intelligence 
Model. These guidelines suggested that the definition of prolific offenders should consider: (1) 
the nature and volume of the crimes an offender committed; (2) the nature and volume of other 
harms the offender caused; and (3) other local criteria based on the impact of the offender on 
their local communities (Home office 2001). British Columbia has developed these criteria into 
three specific areas: (1) offenders who committed a high volume of relatively less serious 
offences, such as thefts to support drug addictions; (2) offenders who committed more serious 
crimes, such as sex crimes or armed robberies; and (3) appropriately called priority offenders, 
individuals who were members of organized crime groups, for example, even if they had no prior 
convictions.22 
The manner in which PPOs were confronted and dealt with was a key aspect of the 
success achieved in various parts of the United Kingdom. The approach was a mixture of 
empathy and tough actions. There was recognition that these offenders, in particular, were often 
characterized by a range of social problems needing attention. There was also the recognition 
that offenders must clearly understand that they were facing a united approach from the CJS with 
the goal of helping them rehabilitate (Home Office, 2007). Part of this process involved police 
and probation jointly at the time when offenders were first told that they were designated PPOs 
 
22 Discussions within the senior management team of the RCMP, “E” Division November. 2006. 
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and that there would be a concentrated focus on them. Offenders were clearly told that while the 
ultimate goal was rehabilitation, they would be monitored closely and expected to stay out of 
crime and to obey court imposed conditions. They were also made to understand that violations 
of conditions would result in a swift return to court. On the other hand, offenders understood that 
they would receive assistance in dealing with any underlying issues that contributed to their 
offending (Home Office, 2007). As this type of assistance frequently involved drug treatment, a 
close working relationship between several agencies was necessary. 
The PPO strategy was led by Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). The 
emphasis was a multi-agency approach to deal with both the crime issue and the individual 
offender. These partnerships included a broad range of agencies, such as police, Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS), prisons and probation, health, education, housing, and others, 
working together with the local criminal justice board (LCJB) to catch, convict, monitor, and 
manage and rehabilitate offenders in the community or custody (Home Office, 2001). The 
LCJBs have CPS and court services as members and the PPO schemes have a joint focus on the 
complimentary targets of each partnership. 
This specific approach is one of the key differences with community policing practices 
as, theoretically, it places much more rigor on the way partnerships are established and managed. 
Each CDRP is responsible for identifying its own target group of PPOs by using the National 
Intelligence Model and CDRP strategic priorities. This process enabled practitioners to identify 
the most prolific offenders, the most persistently anti-social in their behaviors, and those who 
posed the greatest threat to the safety and confidence of their local communities. Individuals 
could be identified as a PPO at any point in their offending cycle; before arrest, while in custody, 
or post-sentence. Joint partnerships between the police, probation, Youth Offending Teams 
(YOTs), and prisons remain critical to the success of the scheme.  
Critical success factors that have been documented in the United Kingdom include: (1) 
ensuring that there are clear established protocols set up between agencies to exchange 
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information and establish effective communication from the outset; (2) adopting a strong multi-
agency approach with active involvement from all agencies, including the police, probation, 
community drugs teams, alcohol services, employment and training services, housing, CPS, and 
the courts; (3) holding regular joint meetings to discuss the targeting of PPOs, the progress of 
offenders, or any operational issues; (4) the development of clear criteria for inclusion on the 
scheme and a clear referral process; and (5) developing good communication channels to ensure 
that offenders and potential offenders are diverted away from crime and anti-social behaviors 
and, where this does not occur, that swift police action is taken to arrest the offender and bring 
him or her before the courts.23  
This entire approach was designed to reduce the amount of criminal offending by 
extremely active offenders through apprehension, rendering these offenders unable to re-offend. 
An example of this type of offender might be a drug-dependent person who commits numerous 
property offences per day in order to sustain their drug habit. Moreover, this approach also 
attempts to get individuals out of crime altogether or, at a minimum, to reduce the number of 
crimes they commit. In effect, this is the long-term and key objective of the crime reduction 
strategy and is instrumental to achieving a sustainable reduction in crime. 
Effective treatment programs are critical in lowering recidivism among the Prolific 
Offender cohort.24 Often, this means drug treatment programs, but may also include treating a 
variety of other issues which contribute to offending, such as the presence of mental disorders, 
gainful employment problems, housing or mobility issues, and familial dysfunction. In other 
words, offender management teams must be fully integrated into seamless “wrap around” 
services providing offenders with opportunities to succeed.  
This chapter has summarized the experiences to date with the CRP in the United 
Kingdom. The messages received through the broad range of interviews and presentations in 
 
23 Briefing on April 20th, 2006 in Newcastle, UK by Nicola Reasbeck, Crown Prosecution Service, who is on the 
Northumbria LCJB and Sheila Proudlock, Newcastle Area Director of HM Courts Service. 
24 Briefings by Drug Treatment Centre staff in Newcastle, UK on April 21st, 2006 
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London and in Newcastle had several consistent themes: (1) that strong and effective 
partnerships are critical and do work; (2) that a majority of prolific offenders can be at least 
partially rehabilitated; (3) that effective drug treatment is critical and works; and (4) that a 
significant reduction in crime is both achievable and sustainable.25 However, Canada’s federal 
system of government does present some challenges in terms of setting a national vision and 
framework similar to that of the United Kingdom. For example, Canada does not have a 
framework mechanism like that described in the NIM. Another challenge in British Columbia 
will be the provision of adequate drug treatment programs. Some communities or cities will be in 
a better position to offer the full range of services and programs necessary to reduce recidivism 
over the long term. This has potential to raise allegations of unfair treatment in areas not able to 
respond as well. This said, any progress in the reduction of crime is a positive event, therefore, it 
may be argued that crime may be reduced to the relative degree of success of the initiative. 
     
Evaluation of the Crime Reduction Program 
In 2004, a comprehensive review of the Crime Reduction Program in the United 
Kingdom was completed by Homel et al.26 The evaluation addressed three key questions: (1) If 
the CRP was about the further development of a crime reduction evidence base, to what extent 
has this evidence base been applied and extended?; (2) If the CRP was supposed to stimulate 
innovation, has it done so and how?; and (3) If the CRP was about increasing crime reduction 
activity, has this occurred and to what degree? In terms of methodology, the process of 
evaluation was managed through the Home Office’s Research Development and Statistics 
 
25 The April, 2006 visit of the B.C. delegation to London and Newcastle involved presentations and discussions with 
over 60 U.K. officials representing the Home Office, municipal governments, police, probation workers, drug 
treatment workers, prosecutors, health care workers, youth workers, CDRP partners, and prolific offenders. These 
meetings provided a comprehensive understanding of how the initiative was working there and the degree of 
implementation. 
26 This should not be confused with the evaluations on the Prolific and Priority Offender Schemes which I shall 
discuss later.   
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Directorate (RDS), but the individual evaluation tasks, for the most part, were contracted out to 
independent research groups, mostly based in universities (Homel et al., 2004). 
The evaluation concluded that, in general terms, the program did make extensive use of 
the available evidence (Homel et al., 2004). It found, however, that projects with less direct 
involvement with the Home Office tended to be less evidence-based. The evaluation program 
was considered to be of generally high quality resulting in extending the evidence base overall. 
Innovation was not achieved during the CRP’s implementation process because of a struggle 
within the program between the original research/learning agenda and the subsequent 
mainstream program objectives of reducing volume crime (Homel et al., 2004). 27  
The effective promotion and adoption of innovation required significant support and 
nurturing, however, the focus on innovation all but disappeared from the programme within 12 
months of its inception. While it is not clear from the research why this occurred, it would appear 
that a stronger focus on issues related to funding received greater attention. Finally, the level of 
crime reduction activity produced was well below the original expectations and projections for 
the CRP.28 While crime reduction activity increased substantially, and there were some 
promising signs that levels of activity would be sustained, the CRP demonstrated that 
programme delivery required more input than just money and good plans. 
Maguire (2004) was critical of the Crime Reduction Program. He noted that the urgency 
of government priorities was used to replace proper research:   
 
It suffered from major practical problems caused by unfeasible timescales, slow-
moving bureaucratic procedures, and shortages of ‘capacity’. Low commitment to 
project integrity, cultural resistance among practitioners, and insufficient attention to 
differences between academics’ and policy makers’ understandings of research, also 
contributed to its problems. While some useful outcomes can be claimed, the results 
of the Crime Reduction Programme as a whole were unquestionably disappointing 
(Maguire, 2004: 214). 
 
 
27 The term “volume crime” in the U.K. related generally to what we in Canada refer to as property crime.  
28 This was highlighted by the struggle within the programme between the original research/learning agenda and the subsequent 
mainstream programme objectives of reducing volume crime. 
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While the article was indeed generally critical of the program overall, Maguire did state: 
 
Finally, despite the inevitably negative tone of much of this article, it is important to 
end by emphasizing that the CRP has by no means sunk without trace, and that some 
of its elements have not only produced useful research results but spawned new 
thinking and new practice initiatives. This is visible particularly in areas where 
investment in projects continued into a ‘second phase’, where there has been 
evidence of major improvement in project design and implementation as those 
involved have learned from previous mistakes (2004: 232). 
Perhaps the key observation by Maguire was that: 
 
As has been pointed out elsewhere in this volume, evaluating the ‘effectiveness’ of 
interventions is one of the most difficult of all research tasks, and it takes a long time 
and many studies before any faith can justifiably be placed in statements about how, 
when and why a particular response to crime or offenders is likely to produce an 
impact. Given this, and given all the problems described earlier, it is tempting to 
conclude that the ideal of ‘evidence-based policy’ may be more effectively pursued 
as a series of quiet iterative processes in individual corners of the criminal justice 
arena, than through one large-scale and high profile ‘programme’” (Emphasis 
added) (2004: 233). 
Tilley (2004) argued that social programs, such as Crime Reduction, were only as good as the 
theories upon which they were grounded. Therefore, as programs changed, theories had to adapt. 
It was important, he argued, that one be able to accurately identify and track the range of theories 
in order to effectively evaluate a program. 
These two authors provided a useful perspective and context for examining the evaluation 
mechanisms for the CRP. The actual program being evaluated was the funded pilot programs 
beginning in April, 1999 and ending in March, 2002. Tilley (2004) detailed the key problems 
with the program and it is important that these reasons be well understood as other jurisdictions, 
such as British Columbia, move forward. According to Tilley (2004), the evidence-based 
rationale for the allocation of funding was compromised at the start with the distribution of more 
that £150 million additional money specifically for closed circuit television. While there were 
some promising research findings about the crime prevention effectiveness of CCTV in specific 
settings, notably car parks, findings in other settings were mixed and, on the whole, rather 
disappointing, notwithstanding public and political support (Poyner, 1991; Tilley, 1993; Ditton 
and Short, 1999; Phillips, 1999; Welsh and Farrington, 2003; Homel et al., forthcoming).  
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Additionally, local bids for funding were rarely rooted in local evidence and the measures 
proposed were not selected on the basis of the strength of evidence regarding their efficacy. A 
review of bids by an independent reviewer for the targeted policing stream determined that only 
2% were well targeted in the light of evidence (Bullock et al., 2002). In addition, few bids 
involved innovative responses to problems. Rather, standard approaches tended to be proposed, 
for burglary reduction initiatives (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Moreover, there was widespread 
implementation failure. In a few cases, little was done (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). In many cases, 
what was planned was not implemented, resulting in a 25% to 50% implementation failure rate.  
It would appear that this resulted from inadequate oversight (Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Hanmer, 
2003). Homel et al. (forthcoming) reported a 25% to 50% project implementation failure rate. 
There were also substantial delays in implementation, specifically in the first year where only 
13% of the budget was spent (Homel et al., forthcoming).  
Because of the aforementioned weaknesses, few potentially informative projects emerged 
from the competitive bidding (Homel et al., forthcoming). Though some feedback was made 
available on the basis of early work (Tilley et al., 1999; Maguire et al., 2001), formal evaluation 
findings could not be produced within the original three-year timetable for the program. This 
resulted in lesson learning related to the effectiveness of preventive measures not being fed back 
into the program (Homel et al., forthcoming). There was also a strong sense among those 
responsible for organizing evaluations within the CRP that there was an inadequate supply of 
competent researchers capable of conducting the complex evaluations required (Homel et al., 
forthcoming). Finally, the implementation patterns meant that there was little detailed 
transferable theory testing (Polder, 1992; Ekblom et al., 1996; Bowers et al., 2004). Much of the 
criticism directed at the program, therefore, related to the manner in which funding was allocated 
and tracked and the poor quality of the evaluation research.  
The Home Office (2005) initiated its own evaluation as a response to these criticisms. 
Early findings generally revealed a 10% drop in re-offending by persons in the PPO scheme 
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(Home Office, 2005). The final report on the PPO evaluation was released in 2007 (Home 
Office, 2007). The five key aims of the evaluation were to: (1) identify which offenders had been 
selected as PPOs; (2) explore how schemes had been implemented; (3) identify what 
interventions PPOs received; (4) understand the experiences and perceptions of those engaged by 
the PPO scheme; and (5) explore the affect that the PPO programme may have had on offending. 
Research on the impact of the PPO program used a statistical technique called Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM).29 There were also sixty interviews conducted with PPOs taken from 
across ten different Government Office regions, as well as fifty-two interviews with key PPO 
staff which included police, probation, and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership 
representatives from ten Government Office regions (Home Office, 2007). One of the criticisms 
of the review was that the PSM methodology did not provide a definitive measure with respect to 
the impact of the PPO scheme on criminal offending and found it likely that the influence of 
unobserved variables had weakened the control group (Home Office, 2007). Notwithstanding 
possible problems with the establishment of a proper control group, the report found reason for 
optimism. One of the ways the evaluation measured success was by comparing the total number 
of convictions in the 17 months before and following the PPO program. This analysis revealed 
that there was a 43% reduction in the offending of the entire PPO cohort (Home Office, 2007).  
There was also a substantial reduction in offending following entry into the program; a 
62% reduction in overall convictions in the first 17 months. The rate of offending fell 24% from 
0.51 convictions per month per PPO to 0.39 convictions per month per PPO over the first 12 
months of entry into the program. The number of days between the commission of offences by 
members of the cohort and being sentenced for those offences was reduced by 13 days. Although 
 
29 A number of complementary research methods were used which, when taken together, aimed to provide a 
reasonable indication of the impact of the PPO programme. The methods used were a combination of offender 
interviews, PPO staff interviews, an analysis of the offending of PPOs prior to and following their entry into the 
PPO programme, and an attempt to draw comparisons between any changes in PPO offending with an appropriate 
control group identified using a statistical technique called Propensity Score Matching (PSM). 
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further analysis of the data was needed, the preliminary results were described as encouraging 
(Home Office, 2007).  
Given the disproportionately large numbers of crimes committed by PPOs, a 43% 
reduction in re-offending is highly significant in terms of the larger numbers of crimes being 
avoided.  Criticism of the CRP, as detailed above, does not mean that the theories underlying the 
PPO scheme are not valid.  
The constitutional structure of Canada makes it difficult to implement a program in the 
same manner as in the United Kingdom as more than one level of government has responsibility 
for law enforcement. However, that fact may not necessarily act as an impediment to a “bottom 
up” approach in Canada. Much of the criticism of the United Kingdom program related to 
implementation failures (Bullock and Tilley, 2002). A more effective method might be to break 
the CRP into smaller, more manageable pieces. Furthermore, a more collaborative approach in 
the development of the program would work better here in British Columbia. In other words, a 
consultative process with Mayors and Councils and with communities providing input into the 
planning process could be organized. This is important because one of the key steps towards 
more effective integration is to build integration at the ground level where services are provided. 
Finally, there is the unique opportunity to learn from the United Kingdom’s experience, to take 
what has worked well, and to avoid that which has not. To this end, the next chapter of this paper 
will examine the progress of the implementation of the CRS in British Columbia and note the 
key distinctions in the British Columbia approach from the United Kingdom model. 
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Chapter Three: The Evolution of Crime Reduction in British 
Columbia 
This chapter will provide an account of how the RCMP, as one criminal justice 
stakeholder, attempted to set the stage for the implementation of crime reduction in British 
Columbia.30 As mentioned in Chapter Two, there were a number of valuable lessons to be 
learned from the implementation process in the United Kingdom. One important lesson was 
highlighted by Maguire’s (2004) suggestion that some of the implementation problems 
encountered in large scale programs might be more effectively dealt with through a series of 
smaller iterative processes conducted in different areas of the criminal justice system. To this 
end, the implementation process and strategy in British Columbia and Canada has involved small 
steps with extensive partnerships with other departments and agencies.31  
On the basis of the United Kingdom experience, change towards a CRS required careful 
planning and implementation strategies with clarity about the theoretical and conceptual 
underpinnings of the process. A sound communication strategy was also critical. In order to 
accomplish this, the process was started with a number of key briefings to large numbers of 
RCMP management staff followed by extensive written briefings to the RCMP membership at 
large.32 As noted throughout this major paper, the move to a crime reduction strategy in British 
Columbia involved a change in terms of both the scope of the initiative and the relative parts to 
be played by everyone. The key role of municipal and provincial governments represented a 
fundamental shift away from the concept of police working only with the community and other 
local partners. It added the critical component of government leadership and horizontal 
integration of government agencies. 
 
30 Comments regarding the implementation of crime reduction are based on the author’s direct involvement in the 
planning and implementation process through my roles as the Criminal Operations Officer and Commanding Officer 
of the RCMP in British Columbia. 
31 Internal RCMP documents between January and May, 2005. 
32 Memoranda and quarterly newsletters were circulated to all RCMP employees in British Columbia beginning in 
May, 2005 and remain ongoing. 
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Throughout the evolution of the strategy, there have been unforeseen, yet welcome, 
developments which could be best characterized in two general phases. The first was the very 
rapid and positive degree of “buy-in”, both internally from the RCMP and externally with 
partners in the CJS and other parts of municipal, provincial, and the Federal governments. The 
second phase involved the discovery that several partner agencies were already involved in 
similar and complimentary initiatives and that a lack of communication hid this fact from all 
involved.33 For example, work was underway within the Ministry of the Attorney General, B.C. 
to improve upon internal process. In a similar fashion, the Chief Provincial Court Judge had 
begun an in-depth examination of processes within the court system in an effort to make 
improvements. This was similar, in many ways, to work being done by the Better Trials Unit in 
the United Kingdom. As well, B.C. Corrections had developed several innovative treatment 
programs which, to some extent, mirrored the wrap around services in the United Kingdom.  
Figure 2 illustrates the key milestones in the timeline of implementation of the CRS. The 
timeline begins in October, 2005, when the Memorandum of Understanding between the RCMP, 
the Province of British Columbia, the University College of the Fraser Valley, and Simon Fraser 
University was signed naming three University Research Chairs to work with the RCMP on 
developing the evidence-based research to support the crime reduction strategy. From there, 
Figure 2 details the significant milestones in the development of the CRS in British Columbia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Comments and observations gathered in meetings conducted by Dr. Allan Castle with Provincial Government 
agencies between November, 2006 and February, 2007. 
Figure 2:  Crime Reduction Strategy Implementation Timeline. 
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Based on my observations, there were specific implementation timelines and processes to 
consider. Given the differences noted earlier between the United Kingdom implementation and 
British Columbia, not the least of which was the fact that the United Kingdom initiative was 
government led, funded, and legislated, there was considerable uncertainty in British Columbia 
with respect to not only what could be achieved within policing, and more specifically within the 
RCMP, but what the interest would be in such a strategy with the rest of the CJS.34   
                                                 
34 Ongoing discussions in the management team of the RCMP and with the University Chairs between September 
2005 and December, 2006. 
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For that reason, the initial focus was on a small part of a PPO initiative which the police 
had direct influence on, namely, an enforcement focus on prolific offenders. Although the entire 
crime reduction strategy in British Columbia does not only include the PPO initiative, to date, 
this initiative has received the most attention and energy from the RCMP. When the pilot sites to 
concentrate on prolific offenders were selected in the Fall of 2005, only six RCMP detachments 
were chosen, representing large and small detachments and urban and rural ones.35 This initiative 
proved to be very popular with the police membership and, as a consequence, ad hoc initiatives 
started up around the Province outside the formal pilot sites with virtually all of them showing 
positive results within relatively short periods of time.36 Although the choice to use a “series of 
quiet iterative processes in individual corners of the justice system” (Maguire, 2004: 244) was 
the only one available to the RCMP at the time, in light of the United Kingdom experience, this 
may not have been a particularly bad option. 
Presentations on the crime reduction strategy started in late 2005 with briefings to all 
senior officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) across the Province. This was followed 
by a communications plan including newsletters to the entire membership of the Division. As 
support within the RCMP grew, and there was greater discussion and integration with Crown 
Counsel, acceptance grew culminating in direction from the Assistant Deputy Minister to 
Regional Crown Counsel to work with police on the PPO strategy. One of the main limitations of 
this approach was that nothing was being done to address the causal factors of crime so that the 
positive impact, in terms of reducing the incidence of crime, lasted only as long as the prolific 
offenders were incarcerated. A key component of the strategy implementation were the briefings 
of nearly all Mayors and Councils of the Municipalities of British Columbia who provided a 
 
35 Pilot projects began in January, 2006 in Courtenay/Comox, Coquitlam, Penticton, Fraser Lake, and Port McNeil.  
These locations were chosen to represent large municipal, medium municipal, and small rural policing areas, as well 
as a mixture of RCMP and municipal police agencies. 
36 Within relatively short periods of time after arresting prolific offenders, pilot project Detachments began to see 
drops in the incidence of a variety of property crimes. 
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strong degree of support and made that support known to Provincial and Federal politicians.37 
Municipal governments recognized the strategy as a vehicle to provide valuable input on issues 
related to crime at the community level.  
While the Provincial Government was supportive throughout the development and 
implementation phase of this strategy, significant momentum developed through the Fall of 2006 
and into the winter of 2007 with the establishment of the Crime Reduction and Criminal Justice 
Reform Office, which was linked to the Ministries of the Solicitor General and Attorney General. 
One of the key goals of this office was making progress on the Integrated Justice model.38 
Included in this office, on secondment, was the head of Court Services for British Columbia, the 
Deputy head of British Columbia Corrections, an RCMP Inspector, and others. The 
establishment of this office and the partnerships developed was a critical component of 
developing this initiative beyond a police initiative against prolific offenders, into a successful 
and fully integrated partnership. It was also important in terms of making the reduction of crime 
sustainable through achieving effective strategies to address crime causation.  
Within weeks of the establishment of this office, observable signs of progress, in terms of 
the development of positive working relationships between different Ministries of Government, 
were evident. All parties shared the same enthusiasm and vision for the initiative. As meetings 
were quickly established with new partners, such as Health, Children and Families, and Housing, 
it was evident that they shared the vision of the RCMP. In summary, based on my direct 
observations, there was broad-based support within the RCMP, at all levels, for this initiative, 
broad-based support within the Municipal and Provincial Governments of the Province of British 
Columbia, and growing support within the Federal Government. 
As noted above, the key partners for the strategy included the Ministry of the Solicitor 
General, the Ministry of the Attorney General, Ministries of Health, Education, and Housing, the 
 
37  In October, 2006, at Victoria, B.C., the Union of British Columbia Municipalities passed a resolution to adopt the 
Crime Reduction Strategy as proposed by the RCMP.  
38 This approach will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter. 
Judiciary, Contract Policing partners at the Municipal and Provincial levels, and Federal 
partners.  
The schematic represented in Figure 3 (Castle, 2006) defined the three critical aspects 
which needed to be in place for an effective CRS, namely the underlying support, 
implementation processes, and governance. 
Figure 3: Crime Reduction Governance and Support 
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This schematic is a visual representation for the proposition that the strategic goals of the CRS, 
primarily dealing effectively with PPOs, required an integrated, multi-agency approach with 
appropriate support in terms of being evidence-based and developed upon efficient CJS 
structures through coordinated CJS services. It also addressed the underlying support structures, 
implementation processes, and governance of the strategy.  
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More specifically, the top of the schematic depicts the strategic goals of the partners 
being actioned and addressed through a multi-agency targeting process across the CJS. This 
required a reliable evidence base, efficient CJS structures, and coordinated CJS services. The 
evidence-based approach, shown in the left hand column, was drawn from the academic 
partnership as well as the analytical services section of the RCMP, and was linked to the 
integrated partners in the CJS. In the centre column, coordinated CJS services were identified as 
being central to both the local CJS partners and to RCMP frontline operations, as well as being 
connected directly to the evidence base, other integrated CJS partners, and to efficient CJS 
structures. Governance, captured in the right hand column, incorporated RCMP management, the 
integrated CJS stakeholders, and the Provincial and Regional Criminal Justice Boards. There 
were also a number of other elements critical to the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia.  
To this point in time, the schematic is representative of the vision for crime reduction in 
British Columbia. There will be challenges to overcome in progressing from the vision to an 
operating model. That said, the actual goals sought are relatively easy to describe. The strategy 
aims to bring all of the appropriate partners together to solve the problems which prevent the 
reduction of crime. That will require a reliable evidence base upon which to make sound 
decisions, efficient and coordinated CJS systems and structures which all work towards shared 
goals, and a series of processes for ongoing review and analysis. At its core, however, the 
importance of strong, effective, and trusting partnerships cannot be overstated.   
 
Other Considerations 
 
RCMP/University Chair Partnership Model   
The RCMP/University Partnership model developed in September, 2005 involved the 
assignment of three University Research Chairs designed to link intelligence-led and evidence-
based policing. The model was developed in such a way as to provide unprecedented access by 
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the Chairs and researchers to police data in a variety of formats. To date, this partnership has 
resulted in a close and collaborative working relationship between the RCMP and academia, 
while ensuring that academic independence was respected.39 In order to facilitate the access of 
police data to the University Research Chairs, secure Crime Labs were established at both Simon 
Fraser University (SFU) and the University College of the Fraser Valley (UCFV) which provides 
researchers with access to all relevant RCMP crime data. This partnership directly addresses the 
issues discussed by Laycock (2001) and others. The Research Chairs have a direct relationship 
with the Division Criminal Intelligence Analysis Section and the Operations Strategy Branch of 
the RCMP. The Research Chairs were linked to specific pilot sites when they began in January, 
2006 and they oversaw the crime reduction work being done there. They traveled throughout 
British Columbia and to other parts of Canada working on and speaking to a broad range of 
interested parties on the CRS.  
The extensive interaction between the Research Chairs and large numbers of students, as 
well as visiting professors, police managers, and frontline officers, continues to foster mutually 
beneficial and trusting relationships as evidenced by the fact that the Research Chairs are in high 
demand by Detachment Commanders around the province and RCMP managers in other 
provinces.40 Participation in conferences is seen as another key role in developing and promoting 
an evidence-based approach to the crime reduction strategy. During 2006, the RCMP, in 
cooperation with University partners, sponsored two international conferences, the International 
Police Executive Symposium (IPES) and the Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis 
(ECCA).41 Both were deemed unqualified successes by the agencies involved and resulted in 
 
39 Memorandum of Understanding signed September, 2005 between Simon Fraser University, the University 
College of the Fraser Valley, the Province of B.C. and the RCMP.  
40 Each of the University Research Chairs is assigned to a specific pilot site at an RCMP Detachment. 
41 Four members of the RCMP, together with the University Research Chairs, will present papers at the 
Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis Conference (ECCA) in London, July, 2007, detailing the work 
done at one of the pilot sites. Another paper will be delivered comparing Crime Reduction in the United Kingdom to 
the ongoing initiative in British Columbia. 
41 ECCA or Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis held its 14th International conference in Chilliwack, 
British Columbia, hosted by the RCMP in 2005. 
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ongoing collaboration. In the summer of 2007, RCMP personnel, recognized for outstanding 
contributions to the Crime Reduction Strategy, are traveling to London, England to present a 
paper at the ECCA conference.42 The goal of this initiative is to further strengthen the 
relationship internationally between police and academics. The RCMP holds a number of 
conferences and less formal meetings each year that the Research Chairs participate in. In 
addition, and in keeping with the spirit of evidence-based information, there are significant 
numbers of research projects currently underway under the auspices of the Memorandum just 
described.43 
  
Integrated Justice   
The concept of developing an integrated CJS is one of the most important goals in 
working towards an effective Crime Reduction Program and criminal justice reform. This is a 
key component of the RCMP crime reduction strategy; a feature that distinguishes CRS from 
community-based policing and problem-oriented policing. These other programs have essentially 
involved issues within the sphere of influence of either the police alone or the police working 
with community partners. The CRS recognized the critical role played by an effective and 
integrated CJS and the need for broader integration into other areas, such as housing, health, and 
 
42 ECCA or Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis held its 14th International conference in Chilliwack, 
British Columbia, hosted by the RCMP in 2005. 
43 A partial list of completed or ongoing projects include: An Analysis of Calls for Service and Dispatched 
Response; An Analysis of the Feasibility of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) for British Columbia; An 
Analysis of  the Criminal Justice Response to Impaired Driving in British Columbia; An Analysis of Police Pursuits; 
Public Safety, Victimization, and Perceptions of the Police; An Analysis of  the Nature and Extent of Illegal Hydro 
Consumption in Marihuana Grow Operations in British Columbia; An Analysis of Auto Thieves and Auto Theft 
Routing in Surrey; A Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Auto Fires in British Columbia; A Criminal History 
Analysis of Prolific Offenders: Robbery as a Case in Point; An Analysis of the Relationship Between Criminals and 
Crimes; Crime Reduction Evaluation Design Plan; Summaries of Crime Reduction Activities in Pilot Sites; Baseline 
Crime Trend Data; British Columbia Version of Iquanta; Pilot Location Trends and Hotspots; Crime Seriousness 
Index; Estimates of Prolific Offenders by Detachment; Case Studies of Highly Prolific Offenders; Crime Analysis 
Toolkit; Support for Local Area Agreements and General Knowledge Transfer; Integrated Justice System Research; 
Prototype Creation of  Integrated Criminal Justice Policy Simulation Model; An Evaluation of DARE; Integrated 
Dog Squad Study; Offender Target Choice; Security Modeling; Design of Research Crime Data Warehouse; Design 
of Interim Policy/Research Databases; Developing and Testing of Crime/Offender Analysis Techniques.  
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education. The term integrated justice, therefore, contemplates a larger group which is far more 
inclusive that what would normally be considered CJS partners.  
One of the challenges to this scope of integration comes as a result of the constitutional 
structure of our country, the federal system, and the relationship that it creates between the 
Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Governments with respect to law enforcement and justice. 
Under the unitary system in the United Kingdom, the national government was able to set a 
vision for the reduction of crime and to provide a legislative framework upon which it was based 
(Home office, 2001). In my role with the RCMP, I have personally observed integrated justice 
with Police, Crown, and Corrections who have targeted high risk prolific offenders. In this case, 
the benefits of an integrated approach were that it eliminated several undesirable outcomes, 
including significant overlap and duplication of effort, wasting of scarce resources, and a general 
lack of efficiency. 
In my view, successful integration in Canada will involve a shifting of resources in some 
cases. A key step on the way to success in this regard is be the establishment of a Provincial 
Community Safety Steering Committee. A core function of this Committee is be to improve the 
safety and livability of B.C. communities by implementing strategies that reduce and prevent 
crime. While this initiative is still in the implementation phase, there will be four core functions 
for the board: 
 
• Develop a common vision, goals and objectives;  
 
• Set priorities and targets for crime prevention and crime reduction;  
 
• Agree on strategies to target resources; and  
 
• Monitoring and report on activities. 44  
 
 
44 Memo dated June 1st, 2007 outlining the role of the committee and setting the first meeting July 27th, 2007  
 As currently proposed, the Committee would be comprised of a broad range of senior 
government officials, police representatives, and First Nations leaders. It will include the Deputy 
Ministers of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Children and Family Development, Health, 
Education, Employment and Income Assistance, Housing, the First Nations Leadership Council, 
the Assistant Deputy Minister of Criminal Justice Branch, the Executive Lead of the Criminal 
Justice Reform Secretariat, an academic representative, the Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities, the Deputy Commissioner Correctional Services Canada, the Deputy 
Commissioner Pacific Region RCMP, and the Chief of the Vancouver Police Department. 
The model set out in Figure 4 situates one possible structure of the Committee in terms of 
the current government structure and the front-line service delivery at the community level. 
Figure 4: Integrated Justice Model 
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The mandate of the Committee is described as follows: 
 
The Provincial Criminal Justice Board leads the process of criminal justice reform in 
British Columbia, facilitating co-ordination, collaboration, and application of 
evidence based practices toward the goals of improved public safety, increased 
confidence in the justice system, greater system efficiencies, and better 
responsiveness to First Nations. The Board establishes reform objectives, co-
ordinates the planning to achieve them, and sets targets for improved results (RCMP 
Internal Briefing Note, 2007). 
The fragmentation of the CJS is not only ineffective in terms of dealing with offenders, reducing 
recidivism, and reducing crime, but is also responsible for wasting the limited resources 
available to address these complex issues.  
For example, the PPOs, more often than not, access or are linked to numerous agencies 
within and closely related to the CJS. They are in frequent contact with the police, the courts, 
corrections, social services, health systems, and others. It is, therefore, critically important that 
these agencies work together to avoid any duplication of effort and ensure that the action taken 
by any one agency does not work against those of another in a “wrap around” approach. The 
offender management team must bring to bear the specific skills and actions uniquely required 
for each offender recognizing that each offender has different needs. 
As illustrated by Figure 5 (Castle, 2006),45 one can observe how the PPO scheme fits 
with the concept of Integrated Justice and how Integrated Justice is dependent on a wide variety 
of partners within and outside the CJS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Dr. Allan Castle is the Officer in Charge of the Criminal Analysis Section, RCMP, Vancouver, British Columbia. 
Figure 5: Integrated Justice Partners  
 
This diagram captures and describes the critical components of the CRS, including the manner in 
which all of the stakeholders have to work together with shared goals and performance targets 
within an integrated justice framework to assist and respond to offenders in a holistic manner 
which balances the needs of the offender with the protection of society. 
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In summary, the strategy implemented in British Columbia has been guided by the 
process and success of the United Kingdom. However, given the constitutional framework of 
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Canada
ew of the current state of affairs with respect to crime 
in Briti
gain support for implementation. External 
commu
’s federal system, there have been unique challenges. Furthermore, the RCMP has 
worked with partners in the CJS to develop the crime reduction program through a process of 
consensus-building techniques and strategies. By way of summarizing the key elements of 
progress to date with respect to implementation of the crime reduction strategy in B.C., it could 
be described in terms of two main phases. 
Phase One involved the examination and analysis of crime reduction programs in other 
jurisdictions, outside of Canada, and a revi
sh Columbia and Canada. This analysis led to an increasingly stronger focus on the CRP 
in the United Kingdom and eventually to a realization that, although an exact replica of that CRP 
was not feasible or suitable in British Columbia, many of the key principles and much of the 
underlying theory could be adopted to work in British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada. This 
phase also involved the development of an evidence-based approach, primarily achieved through 
the Memorandum of Understanding described above. 
Phase Two involved a strong internal and external communication plan. Internally, it was 
designed to provide information to personnel and to 
nication shared these common goals, but added another important one. In the end, the 
potential of the program, in terms of the breadth of effective partnerships, would be wholly 
dependent on partners voluntarily joining. As a result, it the beginning, it was not possible to 
know with certainty how many partners would join and, therefore, how successful the initiative 
would be. At the same time, pilot projects were started in RCMP jurisdictions across various 
parts of B.C. Internal interest and support for the initiative exceeded expectations, both in terms 
of the results achieved at the pilot sites and in the number of initiatives being started in other 
RCMP jurisdictions outside of the designated pilot sites. External partnerships and support were 
also highly successful. These involved municipal and provincial elected officials and ministry 
employees. Efforts to build new partnerships as well as to strengthen existing ones will be 
ongoing as these partnerships and the CRS evolve and mature. 
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Much has been learned since the implementation of the crime reduction strategy 
in British Columbia. This chapter will detail the important lessons learned and will make 
several recommendations with respect to critical aspects of the initiative which will not 
only assist with the ongoing implementation in British Columbia, but will also provide a 
framework document for other provinces as they move forward with their programs. 
Notwithstanding many innovative programs in policing over the past thirty years 
and the “professionalisation” of policing, crime continues to flourish, officer caseloads 
grow, and there is a corresponding decline in police clearance rates (Malm et al., 2005). 
In recent years, police have recognized that many of the underlying causes of crime are 
beyond the sphere of influence of policing. There has also been a corresponding growing 
involvement on the part of community members and leaders with respect to issues around 
crime. This has allowed for the formation of broad-based partnerships focused on crime 
and crime causation.  
Even with the high degree of support and enthusiasm, there are significant 
challenges in the process of implementing a broad-based, cross-government crime 
reduction strategy. These challenges relate to matters of governance, measurement, legal 
issues, information systems, and organizational culture. The fact that Canada has a 
federal system complicates the issue of integration as the federal government cannot 
simply mandate this strategy. Moreover, implementing broad-based changes to any large 
organization is difficult. The challenges increase substantially when this change is 
simultaneously required of multiple agencies. It is for this reason that one of the most 
significant challenges to the CRS is changing organizational cultures. Although it has 
been noted above that implementation of the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia 
has not encountered some of the usual problems associated with organizational changes 
Chapter Four: Conclusions and Recommendations
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oth internal and 
external relationships. 
Change Management 
Changes of the magnitude required by the CRS necessitate careful planning and 
ongoing monitoring and adjustment. It is important that careful consideration be given to 
the skill sets of the key individuals leading the change and program implementation. 
According to Enterprise-Wide Change, these skills include: (1) a deep understanding of 
the change process and the main concepts of systems thinking; (2) discipline and courage 
to ensure consistency, integrity, and focus of the entire enterprise to its strategic 
positioning in the marketplace, year after year; and (3) persistence and energy over the 
long term to ensure superior results through a focus on both the economic alignment of 
delivery and the cultural attunement with people’s hearts and minds (Anderson et al., 
2006). One of the key issues in managing change of this magnitude is to ensure effective 
communication. Not only is it important to communicate effectively, there is a need to 
measure how well this is being done.   
In addition, Tilley and Laycock commented specifically on the attributes of team 
leaders for the implementation of this particular type of strategy: 
of this magnitude, the topic is worthy of mention with respect to b
  
46
 
The individual or group carrying out this function needs to be ‘research-
literate’ – they need to know what the research literature has to say about 
problem specification and tactics, mechanisms and contexts. They also need 
to be sufficiently senior - carry enough clout - to be able to direct the use of 
police and other resources and, when relevant, to relate to other potential 
contributors to any strategic plan (2002:46). 
 
Over the past year, there have been ongoing personal briefings and discussions regarding 
the initiative within the RCMP. As well, the best published research papers have been 
                                                 
46 The RCMP conducts regular surveys within their membership which asks several questions about 
communications when new strategies are being implemented. 
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made available to the RCMP to ensure that the team is as “research literate” as possible. 
ey measures of success with respect to making the team “research 
literate” will be through the observable reduction of crime.  
, the plan to get “buy-in” has been underway for some time 
and co
programs in organizations (Tilley, 2004). One of these elements involves assessing what 
completed an evaluation (Tilley, 2004). This is 
re early success is not 
evident s both the 
risk of ot taking 
respons
Resource appropriation can also lead to problems specifically with respect to the 
                                                
Ultimately, one of the k
In British Columbia
ntinues to evolve as the RCMP understands and identifies the positions of the 
various CJS partners.47 This is important because there are several key issues that must 
be considered or addressed when implementing and evaluating large scale changes across 
is being done in other jurisdictions and emulating success. While this may suggest a lack 
of program innovation when another jurisdiction is considering implementation, it is 
always beneficial to examine the lessons learned from others to avoid making similar 
mistakes or wasting time and resources.  
Another key element is prematurely abandoning policies or projects based on an 
unsupported assumption that they are about to fail or because they currently have not 
closely related to the use of agenda setting 
messaging about programs. In other words, in situations whe
, there may be efforts to blame others for the apparent failure. There i
individuals claiming early success without supporting evidence or n
ibility for failing initiatives. 
legitimacy of bids in grant allocation processes (Tilley, 2004). Non-recipients of grants 
 
47 One of the measures with respect to “buy-in” is to encourage feedback and criticism of the initiative and 
menting the strategy. 
to actively seek out input from employees. This is done through employee surveys, town hall meetings, and 
one-on-one meetings with those individual commanders imple
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 they can maintain a positive 
relation
gnitude in an organization as divers and the 
RCMP.
n, would be readily apparent. In part, this criticism 
refers b
                                                
may engage in activities harmful to programs as a result of their efforts to remain 
competitive. There is also the potential for personnel to provide unsupported positive 
feedback to managers about the progress of projects so that
ship with them. In either of the cases of those who receive funding or those who 
do not, there is the potential for individuals to simply tell managers what they want to 
hear. It is anticipated that it would be relatively easy to determine whether this is 
occurring in the current initiative through active monitoring of the degree of partnership 
building. Failing to develop strong partnerships would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
hide in a policing organization. 
Finally, there is a risk of subversion of efforts by personnel who, for a variety of 
reasons, do not support the project (Rogers, 2002). This is an important issue to address 
when implementing changes of this ma
48 Laycock and Webb (2003) pointed to similar concerns with respect to the 
ability for programs, such as crime reduction, to succeed. More directly, they commented 
on cultural issues within police organizations that had to be dealt with effectively in order 
for these initiatives to work. An example of this potential problem can be seen in the 
partnership issue mentioned above. Individuals in policing who believe that the role of 
police ends with the arrest and processing of suspects may exhibit reluctance to 
developing partnerships, which agai
ack to Goldstein (2003) and his work in POP.49 Both Laycock and Webb (2003) 
 
48 The RCMP polices 130 towns and cities in B.C. and over 700 across Canada from coast to coast and 
throughout the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. 
problems and evaluate 
49 Goldstein identified five reasons for the challenges posed by traditional police culture. These were: (1) 
the absence of long-term commitment from police leaders to strengthen policing and the police as an 
institution; (2) the lack of analytic skills within a police agency needed to analyze 
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s. The provision of services is a critical 
feature
and Knutsson (2003) made the argument that, while there was convincing evidence that 
the concept of evidence-based problem solving was a valid goal for implementation into 
the CJS, the task of introducing these processes into a police environment was 
underestimated. Based on my experiences, however, these types of challenges have 
largely been overcome in British Columbia.50  
Funding will present challenges at more than one stage of the implementation 
process. There will be a need to work in concert with other agencies to secure funding for 
drug treatment, rehabilitation, and the types of “wrap around” services necessary to 
provide PPOs with the best chances of succes
 of an effective PPO program and requires the RCMP to convince all three levels 
of government to make appropriate contributions. Accomplishing this will not be easy 
and will require considerable effort as the strategy moves forward. In fact, these 
challenges represent another of the key goals of integrated justice and effective 
integration of government services, namely the need for each partner to understand the 
importance of effectively sharing available resources and funding for the greatest 
possible benefit of the whole. 
A challenge which has developed from the success of the implementation process 
to date is the rapid expansion and the desire by many RCMP detachments to get involved 
                                                                                                                                                 
strategies for dealing with the problems; (3) the lack of a clear academic connection; (4) the absence of 
informed outside pressure; and (5) the lack of financial support. 
50 Prior to the signing of the M.O.U. with the University Research Chairs and the RCMP in September, 
er of collaborative projects involving many 
2005, a high level of trust and respect already existed between the RCMP and numerous university 
researchers in B.C. This is evidenced by a large numb
researchers and RCMP members, such as two extensive studies on marihuana growing operations. This 
relationship has been enhanced with the signing of the MOU through more structured and intensive 
interaction on a variety of studies, joint conferences, and frequent meetings.  
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, information systems and data collection 
issues 
 throughout this major paper, the federal system in Canada 
recogni
fragments the administration of justice and provides impediments to setting a national 
vision with respect to issues related to crime. Notwithstanding that there are significant 
and to move forward with initiatives.51 This has created substantial pressures on 
implementation staff as well as analytical staff needed to provide the solid evidence-
based foundation for the strategy. The expansion of the crime reduction strategy to other 
parts of Canada further exacerbates this challenge and underscores the requirement for 
effective communication processes. In addition
continue to present critical challenges to implementation and are a key focus of 
efforts to find solutions in the early stages.  
A new records management system is currently being implemented in British 
Columbia; Police Record Information Management (PRIME). This system will begin to 
address one of the key components necessary for the success of a crime reduction 
initiative and will be one of the primary data sources used for both program development 
and analysis/evaluation. Given that the implementation of PRIME is ongoing, it is too 
early to determine whether there will be limitations to the system with respect to the 
CRS. 
Finally, the involvement and participation of the federal government will continue 
to be a key challenge. As noted
zes clear and distinct roles between provincial and federal governments in the 
administration of justice.52 While there are several benefits to this arrangement, it 
                                                 
51 Several Detachments not included in the pilot studies, such as Kamloops and Surrey, have implemented 
extensive crime reduction strategies. 
52 Criminal law is created at the Federal level, however, for the most part; the administration of justice is 
carried out by the Provinces and Territories. 
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Program Evaluation 
risdictions. Furthermore, the implementation 
team m
 In addition to the collection of baseline data, as is the case in all program 
evaluation, it is necessary to clearly identify what the program being evaluated was 
and re-offending. An evaluation of the RCMP proposed CRS must involve several 
distinct
evaluations will examine the broad questions of the degree to which the crime reduction 
 
challenges to the implementation of the CRS, there is considerable optimism that they 
can be overcome.53 
Program evaluation will be yet another challenge. Effective program evaluation 
begins with the identification of key baseline data prior to implementation. The collection 
and analysis of baseline data has been done in the five pilot sites in British Columbia with 
additional data being collected from other ju
ust work to address the lack of CJS measures in Canada and will develop 
appropriate tools to fill this void.  
intended to do. In the Canadian context, the stated goals of the CJS remain somewhat 
vague. For example, there is reference to such objectives as maintaining public 
confidence in the CJS, but there are no explicit goals associated with the reduction of 
crime 
 and independent evaluations, conducted on different parts of the CJS, and 
focusing on different elements of the crime reduction strategy. In other words, 
strategy is achieving its overarching goals, but these findings will be complementary to 
evaluations of specific programs and strategies throughout the province which fall under 
the crime reduction framework. An evaluation framework will be developed the Office 
for Crime Reduction and Criminal Justice Reform during the summer of 2007. 
                                                 
53 Throughout ongoing meetings with Municipal, Provincial, and Federal officials since November, 2005, 
rk optimism has been expressed by Deputy Ministers in several Provinces and Territories that they will wo
towards solutions.  
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 crime reduction strategy in British Columbia remains in its infancy, 
perhaps the most important lesson learned to date is that significant system-wide change 
“bottom-up” approach. Furthermore, it may, in fact, be a more 
effectiv
ers (Rogers, 2002). The approach taken in British 
Columb
Implications for the Future  
There are significant implications for the CJS here in British Columbia and in 
Lessons Learned 
Although the
can be achieved through a 
e mode of implementation than that employed in the United Kingdom. The 
program in the United Kingdom was supported by legislation and significant funding. 
The initiative had the full weight of the Prime Minister’s office and there was 
considerable pressure on public officials to ensure success. “Top down” changes of this 
magnitude always run the risk of developing obstacles to implementation, such as a lack 
of buy-in by lower level manag
ia to begin within the policing sphere of influence and to gradually work 
outwards has resulted in a broad degree of acceptance of the strategy from within the 
RCMP. Indeed, there has been no observable reluctance or disagreement with the 
program from the RCMP.  
Another important lesson learned at this early stage was that there was ongoing 
work in other components of the CJS which complimented efforts being made by the 
police. What was missing was a coordinating effort to bring together all of the initiatives 
already in operation in all the various agencies. This discovery alone provides additional 
impetus for an integrated approach within the CJS. Given the critical role played by 
effective partnerships (Home Office, 2006), and the fact that, to this point, it does not 
appear that this strategy will be a legislated, government-led initiative, the coordination 
of efforts occurring in different parts of the CJS is important. 
 
Canada as a result of the crime reduction strategy. In January, 2007, the RCMP made a 
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 crime reduction throughout those jurisdictions of Canada where it 
provide
CMP to include other police agencies in Canada. However, 
this pro
                                                
decision to implement
d policing services.54 In February, 2007, a national workshop was held in 
Vancouver hosting policing representatives with representation from the Government of 
Canada. It is now apparent that programs similar to the one in British Columbia will 
begin in other parts of Canada in 2007.55 While it is too early in the process to be certain, 
a desirable outcome would be the development and implementation of a National 
Integrated Justice Strategy which would compliment and coordinate those in the 
Provinces and Territories. An Office of Crime Reduction has been established within the 
National Headquarters of the RCMP in Ottawa and its role will be to implement crime 
reduction across Canada within the RCMP. The involvement of all levels of government 
is the desirable end result. 
In British Columbia, the provincial government has made crime reduction a 
priority for all policing agencies. As this initiative grows at the national level, it will 
likely extend beyond the R
cess will take place province by province or territory by territory as the federal 
government has no authority to instruct the entire country to implement the CRS.  
However, it appears that the federal government will indeed encourage implementation 
across the country to the extent that it is able to provide funding grants for initiatives 
supportive of the strategy.56 The federal government’s involvement in the CRS is crucial 
in many ways, such as drug treatment issues, and it is now apparent that there is a general 
recognition of this fact.  
 
54 e of the RCMP on December 15th, 2006. 
on, working with the RCMP, implemented its Crime Reduction 
rone speech on April 4th. The governments of Alberta, New 
Brunswi
Andrews
Ministers in the Federal government.  
 Decision by the Senior Executive Committe
55 The Territorial Government of the Yuk
Strategy in April, 2007, announcing it in the th
ck, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland received presentations on the BC initiative in May, 2006 at St. 
, N.B. and Halifax, N.S. Following these meetings, representatives expressed interest and asked 
for further presentations.  
56 Meetings between January and May, 2006 between the Commissioner of the RCMP and Deputy 
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egy and parallel discussions and plans between police and 
govern
n is dependent on the sharing of goals, targets, and the resources 
required to achieve the overall aims of the partnership. Moreover, an effective PPO 
 in terms of the 
            
Recommendations 
Based on the implementation process to this point in British Columbia, there are 
several key recommendations which can be made to people in other jurisdictions 
attempting similar programs. The first recommendation is that considerable time should 
be spent providing briefings on the proposed strategy to all levels of government, to all 
those within the police organization, to all stakeholders or partners who will be involved 
in the program, and with the media to assist in explaining the strategy to the public. The 
benefits derived in the British Columbia experience was a strong degree of support from 
municipal politicians which led to the same support from the province.57 
The concept of integrated justice is an important component in the development 
of a crime reduction strat
ment should complement those being implemented within the police organization. 
Similarly, all initiatives and processes need to be intelligence-led and evidence-based. 
This requires effective data management processes, strong and effective analytical 
capabilities, and strong police/academic partnerships. There also needs to be a solid 
commitment to the process by police leaders responsible for program implementation. 
The critical role of strong and effective partnerships cannot be overstated. The key 
challenge to achieving this is getting to a position where each of the partners shares the 
overall vision and understands their own and each others contributions to the whole. 
Within the partnerships, there needs to be a general recognition that the overall 
success of crime reductio
strategy is the most critical component of a crime reduction strategy
degree of impact possible directly from police organizations. Based on the United 
                                     
. in October, 2006, to adopt crime reduction across the province. 
57 As noted earlier, such consultations led to a motion being passed at the Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities meeting at Victoria, B.C
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bia experiences, the development and implementation of an 
effectiv
da. The RCMP 
has obs
reak 
and En
in British Columbia. In addition, there is a strong level of buy-in from agencies not 
Kingdom and British Colum
e PPO strategy within policing will probably assist in building the larger crime 
reduction strategy within the CJS.   
 
The Current Status 
The RCMP’s journey in the implementation of crime reduction in British 
Columbia over the past two years has been enlightening. What started as an attempt to 
derive greater efficiency within one police force in one province in one part of the CJS 
has spread to multiple agencies within and outside policing across Cana
erved significant reductions in a range of crimes in a number of jurisdictions in 
British Columbia, both at formal pilot sites and in other locations where some 
components of the crime reduction strategy have been introduced. For example, in 
Kelowna, comparing the first quarter of 2007 against the first quarter of 2006, the 
incidence of reported Break and Entry offences was down 20%, Theft of Motor Vehicle 
was down 7%, and Possession of Stolen Property was down 16%. While formal 
evaluations have not been able to attribute these reductions to the work being done under 
crime reduction initiatives, there are strong indicators that this is the case. Similar results 
are being observed in the Surrey statistics which, when comparing data over the same 
periods, indicates that Commercial Break and Entry was down 27%, Residential B
try was down 12%, Theft of Motor Vehicle was down 21%, and Theft Under 
$5,000.00 was down 8%. 
 There have also been structural changes within the provincial government to 
facilitate crime reduction and integrated justice suggesting a genuine interest to support 
this initiative and to make important changes and advances in the criminal justice system 
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 be opposition to the crime reduction strategy which, 
 some, may appear to be “soft on crime”. The current federal government has indicated 
her sentencing guidelines on offenders, including minimum 
sentenc
s if the CJS is to be made more effective. That has been done to 
some e
typically considered part of the CJS, such as the provincial ministries of health, housing, 
and education.   
Nonetheless, there will likely
to
a desire to impose toug
es.58 I would argue, however, that the proposed methods for dealing with PPOs 
under the crime reduction strategy should not be characterized as either tough or soft on 
crime, but as being “intelligent on crime”. The crime reduction method argues for 
intelligence-led sentencing practices, evidence-based sentencing practices, and, 
ultimately, sentencing which addresses the offender rather than the offence. In other 
words, based on this strategy, the type and length of sentence imposed on offenders 
should be uniquely designed and crafted for the specific offender. The obvious benefits to 
this approach include the fact that “wrap-around” services will attempt to address the 
specific underlying problems with individuals in efforts to make them less likely to re-
offend, thereby reducing the numbers of crimes being committed. Achieving success with 
even a small number of highly prolific offenders has the potential to significantly reduce 
overall crime in a given jurisdiction. 
Partners in the CJS have to look beyond their own agencies to the CJS as a whole 
and must critically assess all of the partners’ needs in terms of fiscal and human 
resources. At the provincial level, this involves the recognition that another agency’s 
needs may supersede their
xtent in British Columbia where policing has given up part of its budget to support 
more crown prosecutors and agreed that the current resource needs of correctional 
                                                 
58 Taken from the Progressive Conservative website at http://www.conservative.ca/EN/2888.  “This 
Government will tackle crime. It will propose changes to the Criminal Code to provide tougher sentences 
for violent and repeat offenders, particularly those involved in weapons-related crimes. It will help prevent 
crime by putting more police on the street and improving the security of our borders.” 
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t each agency must look beyond its own needs to those of the CJS as a 
whole 
                                                
agencies should take precedence over policing needs.59 That is the essence of the CRS 
shift, namely tha
having understood and more fully accepted that the integrated approach will be 
significantly more effective for all partners. Integration in terms of budget, goals, and the 
individual case management of offenders is the ultimate goal and presents one of the 
greatest challenges to successful implementation of a crime reduction strategy. 
The CRS being implemented in British Columbia, and soon across Canada, 
although similar to that of the United Kingdom is uniquely designed for Canada. It 
continues to change daily in terms of the expansion of the program. In fact, it might be 
said that this recognition of continual change is one of its strengths. The CRS will 
continue to evolve. It should be viewed as a continuum into the future with its elements 
and descriptors being fluid and adaptable as opposed to a rigid design typical of criminal 
justice organizations of the past. The crime reduction strategy represents a significant 
enhancement of the criminal justice system in British Columbia and one which will lead 
to wider justice reforms in Canada. 
 
59 In 2002, the RCMP made a permanent transfer of $1,000,000.00 from its operating budget in B.C. to the 
Ministry of the Attorney General for the purpose of establishing the Organized Crime Prosecution Team. 
The rationale for this decision was that it made little sense for the police to commit to significant 
investigations against organized crime if there were to be a lack of prosecution resources at the conclusion 
of investigations. 
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performance in justice, public safety and security organizations.  Victoria, British 
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